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### Investment

#### Contention 1- investment

#### The United States currently submits all foreign investment deals related to oil and gas production to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, known as CFIUS. These restrictions chill foreign investment and send a signal of US protectionism.

Wilson Center 5-31-12 (Chinese Investment in North American Energy, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/chinese-investment-north-american-energy)

While Chinese foreign energy investment is on the rise, the more notable story is China’s shift from a net importer of capital to a nation of massive capital outflows, said Adam Lysenko of the Rhodium Group. Energy investment—initially stalled in the wake of the aborted acquisition of Union Oil Company of California (UNOCAL) by China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) in 2005—has increased exponentially with $18.3 billion in bids in 2011 alone. Learning lessons about American protectionism, Chinese firms have changed their strategies since the failed UNOCAL deal and now have made multiple smaller investments that will not attract unwanted political attention. In addition to raw materials, Chinese companies are looking to gain expertise in exploiting these resources for use at home. As for alternative energy, Chinese companies are starting to invest in North American production to get around tariffs. Currently, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) process appears adequate, but the political environment is hurting investment unnecessarily. Lysenko added that many Chinese firms are starting new corporations in the emerging alternative energy industry to avoid CFIUS scrutiny. In order to keep Chinese investments growing, the United States has to find a way to separate national security from politics. While Chinese investment has increased exponentially in the last four years, its total impact should not be exaggerated, said Bo Kong from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. CNOOC’s difficulty in acquiring UNOCAL jaded many Chinese investors from investing in the United States, which significantly slowed the flow of investment in the North American energy industry. Chinese companies’ hesitancy to repeat the failure of the UNOCAL deal and American companies’ concerns about both political interference and intellectual property (IP) theft have tempered Chinese investment in North America. However, smaller and more diverse investments on the part of Chinese companies and more safeguards to protect U.S. IP should help accelerate investment in the future. All three Chinese state-owned oil companies are also listed on the New York Stock Exchange, which indicates a willingness to be more transparent. Getting more Chinese companies involved in research and development will lead to a greater respect for international IP laws. Historically, Japan and South Korea were not good stewards of intellectual property, but as both nations started to develop their own technology, they began to respect IP laws. Many feel that increased investment by Chinese firms in research and development will lead to a similar evolution. While China is a resource-hungry and growing country, the real benefit to North American investment is not the energy extracted but rather the techniques and knowledge gleaned from U.S. and Canadian companies, which will allow China’s companies to better extract resources at home.

#### Scenario 1- Protectionism:

#### Global trade is on the brink of collapse- rising US protectionism risks global escalation.

Lincicome 12 (Scott, trade attorney, “Is Missing American Trade Leadership Beginning to Bear Protectionist Fruit? (Hint: Kinda Looks Like It),” June 12, http://lincicome.blogspot.com/2012/06/is-missing-american-trade-leadership.html)

Over the past few years, I and several other US trade-watchers have lamented the United States' dwindling leadership on global trade and economic issues and warned of that trend's troubling potential ramifications. It appears that at least one of our breathless predictions may finally be coming true. Starting in mid-2009 - when it became depressingly clear that the Obama administration viewed trade in mostly political terms and thus would not be advancing a robust, proactive free trade agenda - we free traders expressed grave concern that US recalcitrance could harm not only US companies and workers, but also the entire global free trade system. As I explained in a 2009 oped urging the President to adopt a robust pro-trade agenda (as outlined in this contemporary Cato Institute paper): Since the 1940s, the US has led the charge to remove international barriers to goods, services and investment. The result: a global trade explosion that has enriched American families, spurred innovation, enhanced our security and helped millions escape poverty. Every US president since Herbert Hoover has championed free trade because of its proven benefits.... Because of today's rules-based multilateral trading system and the interdependence of global markets, US fecklessness on trade shouldn't lead to devastating protectionism akin to the Smoot-Hawley-induced tariff wars of the 1930s. But it's still a problem. In 2008, global trade contracted for the first time since 1982, and protectionist pressures abound. The WTO's Doha Round is comatose, even though an ambitious deal could inject US$2 trillion into the reeling global economy. Considering the US has steered every major trade initiative in modern history, any chance for significant progress on trade will disappear without strong American leadership - in word and deed. Since that time, the President has clearly not taken free traders' advice. The WTO's Doha Round is dead, despite a pretty good opportunity to force the issue back in late 2010. The Obama administration took three years to implement already-dusty FTAs with Korea, Panama and Colombia and actually insisted on watering the deals down with new protectionist provisions in order to finally agree to move them. And while countries around the world are signing new trade agreements left and right, we've signed exactly zero and have eschewed important new participants and demanded absurd domestic protectionism in the one agreement that we are negotiating (the TPP). Meanwhile, on the home front the President has publicly championed mercantilism, as his minions quietly pursued myriad efforts to restrict import competition and consumer freedom, embraced competitive devaluation and maintained WTO-illegal policies (while publicly denouncing protectionism, of course). Pretty stark when you lay it all out like that, huh? Despite this depressing state of affairs, it did not appear that the United States' diversion from its long free trade legacy had resulted in a tangible increase in global protectionism (although the death of Doha certainly isn't a good thing). Unfortunately, a new blog post from the FT's Alan Beattie indicates that those chickens may finally be coming home to roost: One of the very few bright spots in governments’ generally grim recent performance of managing the world economy has been that trade protectionism, rampant during the Great Depression, has been relatively absent. That may no longer be the case. The WTO, fairly sanguine about the use of trade barriers over the past few years, warns today that things are getting worrying. The EU made a similar point yesterday. And this monitoring service has been pointing out for a long time that a lot of the new forms of protectionism aren’t counted under the traditional categories, thanks to gaping holes in international trade law. After glancing at the bi-partisan protectionism on display in the 2012 US presidential campaign, Beattie concludes that, on the global trade stage, "things are looking scarier than they have for a while." I'm certainly inclined to agree, and one need only look South to Brazil's frighteningly rapid transition from once-burgeoning free trade star to economically-stagnant, unabashed protectionist to see a scary example of why. And while I agree with Beattie that the world still isn't likely to descend into a 1930s-style trade war - we can thank the WTO and the proliferation of free market economics for that - the rising specter of global protectionism is undoubtedly distressing. And, of course, it has risen just as America's free trade leadership has faded away. Now, as we all know, correlation does not necessarily mean causation, and it's frankly impossible to know just how much the dearth of US trade leadership has actually affected global trade policies. But I think it's pretty safe to say that it certainly hasn't helped matters. Just ask yourself this: how can the US admonish Brazil or any other country about its distressing mercantilism when the President is himself routinely preaching - and his administration is busy implementing - similar policies? How can we decry the global "currency wars" when we're discretely advocating a similar strategy? How can we push back against nations' increasing use of market-distorting subsidies or regulatory protectionism when we're.... I think you get the idea. As I've frequently noted here, it was a Democrat - Secretary of State Cordell Hull - who over 70 years ago began a global free trade movement that until very recently had been led - in word and deed - by Republican and Democratic administrations alike. And while the distressing recent spike in global protectionism may not have been caused by a lack of American trade leadership, it is very, very likely not going to recede until the United States regains its long-held place at the front of the trade liberalization pack.

#### And, restrictions on oil and gas investments explode the scope of foreign investment CFIUS reviews. This expansion of the CFIUS process is a protectionist tool to keep out investment.

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-09 (James, COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167)

II. Post 9/11 Application of Exon-Florio After 9/11, the CFIUS process shifted to focus more on threats from non-state actors, most noticeably by including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) among the departments heading the CFIUS board. This shift in focus resulted in the scrutiny of several transactions that did not fit into the traditional military-based interpretation of national security, such as the Chinese purchase of an oil company and the purchase of the operation of ports by an Arab company. The change in the Exon-Florio process culminated in the passage of FINSA, which codified a much broader interpretation of national security that encompassed energy assets and other critical infrastructure. A. A Shift in Foreign Policy Perspective Unsurprisingly, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 dramatically changed the American perspective on national security, including the scrutiny of foreign investment. When Exon-Florio passed, at the end of the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was still focused on the realist, state-based model of international relations. 86 This realist model largely envisions foreign policy as a competition between states, in which states struggle to find the proper balance between deterrence and reassurance of other governments regarding their good intentions. 87 According to traditional conceptions of realism, non-governmental actors have little or no significant role to play in international relations. 88 The end of the Cold War and the widening web of globalization broadened the spectrum of foreign policy considerations somewhat, but it was not until after 9/11 that the U.S. national security apparatus really shifted to focus more on a range of non-state security threats. 89 The very nature of the 9/11 attacks made it clear that the instruments of globalization could be used to attack the international order itself, and there was a resultant effort on the part of the United States to secure various commercial facilities, such as airports, [\*180] chemical factories, and ports 90 - exemplified in the formation of the DHS to coordinate domestic security measures against terrorism. Consistent with the realist vision of foreign policy, Exon-Florio had focused on state-based acquisitions of defense-related technologies prior to 9/11, with an emphasis on the unique capabilities acquired by foreign governments or "lost" to the United States present in each transaction. 91 As part of the general paradigm change toward considering threats from non-state actors after 9/11, President Bush added the head of the DHS to the CFIUS board in February 2003. 92 Perhaps not coincidentally, "between January 2003 and December 2005, there were six [CFIUS] investigations, and five withdrawals, more than the previous ten years combined." 93 In 2006, the CFIUS conducted seven investigations, the most ever in a single year. 94 B. The Unocal Incident: Protectionism Run Amok The response to the attempt of CNOOC to purchase Unocal, an American oil company, exemplified the tighter CFIUS approach. 95 CNOOC, a Chinese state-owned oil company, regularly purchased foreign oil companies to create joint-ventures between itself and the foreign companies. 96 The Chinese government recognized that there would be a CFIUS review under the Byrd Amendment, since CNOOC was state-owned, but felt that ultimately there was no security risk and that the transaction would pass the CFIUS review. 97 However, on June 24, 2005, 41 members of Congress from both parties wrote to President Bush urging a thorough CFIUS review of the sale. 98 The letter justified the review by raising questions about "whether CNOOC was using Chinese government funds to make the purchase and whether China [\*181] would be acquiring sensitive technology." 99 Congress followed up this letter with the introduction of a resolution in the House on June 29, 2005, that recognized oil and natural gas as strategic national assets and argued that the purchase of Unocal would allow for the oil reserves to be preferentially sent to China - instead of purchasing them on the open market - thus opening up the possibility of China utilizing the "oil weapon" against the United States. 100 China hawks 101 echoed these arguments, claiming that the deal would give China more leverage over the international oil market and that regardless of the facts of the transaction, the symbolic nature of giving into China's resource goals should be prevented at all costs. 102 Unsurprisingly, hawkish arguments toward China played a large role in congressional opposition to the deal. 103 The Bush administration kept relatively quiet during the Unocal controversy, 104 and eventually CNOOC withdrew their bid in the face of the negative publicity. 105 The most remarkable aspect of this episode was the congressional majority's attempt to implicitly redefine national security. The definition of national security was no longer limited to technologies that were at least arguably related to the national defense industrial complex. Congressional opponents of the Unocal sale used public debate surrounding the deal to include energy assets in an expanded interpretation of national security and continued the long-running congressional struggle to use Exon-Florio and the CFIUS review process as a protectionist tool to prevent foreign investment in U.S. industry. 106 Previous CFIUS reviews focused on technological acquisitions that could allow foreign countries unique access to U.S. military capabilities, 107 in contrast to energy companies, which had no [\*182] direct connection to the military. If national security can also mean "important to the United States economy," as energy assets no doubt are, then the definition of national security differs in no meaningful sense from the original "essential commerce" bill that Reagan threatened to veto in order to strip the economic security provisions.

#### And, expanding the scope of CFIUS reviews undermines US trade leadership and triggers retaliation. The impact is global wars.

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-09 (James, COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167)

C. Economic Retaliation as a Result of CFIUS Protectionism Continued use of Exon-Florio to protect American economic security could also lead to retaliation by our trading partners. 165 The United States loses much of its credibility on global trade leadership when it caves to political pressure and blocks transactions that do not pose a clear threat to national [\*190] security, as it did during the Dubai Ports incident. 166 If the Exon-Florio power continues to widen to affect foreign investment outside of direct national defense concerns, then other countries will replicate such legislation, and protectionist trade wars will escalate. 167 In fact, France, Russia, India, and Canada have already passed, or are considering, more restrictions on foreign investment as a result of what is seen abroad as U.S. protectionism disguised as the CFIUS blocking deals for national security reasons. 168 Russian legislators directly cited the U.S. example of the CFIUS when they debated the potential restrictions on foreign investment: The government has decided to use [the] experience of the US ... where there are stringent limitations for purchase of assets by foreign investors... . In the US if a foreign company is going to buy more than 5% of shares in a company that fulfills orders of the Department of Defense, [the] permit for such [a] deal is issued by the President. 169 The Russian Economy Minister, German Gref, even made the case that the proposed Russian restrictions on foreign investment would be more liberal than the CFIUS process of the United States. 170 Similarly, India retaliated against CFIUS restrictions on one of its telecom companies by placing similar restrictions on U.S. telecom firms that were attempting to enter the Indian market. 171 The Indian government felt that it needed to exclude U.S. companies as long as the United States was restricting Indian companies' transactions with American firms. 172 Both of these incidents are illustrative of a larger point: as long as the United States restricts [\*191] foreign investment unnecessarily through the CFIUS process, other countries will do likewise, inhibiting global trade. 173 Diagnosing the benefits of free trade goes beyond the scope of this Comment, but there is virtual unanimity among economists on both the benefits of foreign direct investment and free trade to the U.S. economy. 174 Without foreign direct investment, the U.S. economy would lose nearly ten million jobs. 175 A dynamic American economy is crucial to national security because without a strong economy, there would be insufficient revenue for the military and national defense. 176 If the U.S. economy were to contract even further, there could be isolationist pressure to reduce the defense budget and withdraw from international commitments. 177 Moreover, global free trade contributes to global stability by spreading democracy, integrating national economies, and dramatically raising the cost of war. 178 Support for regulation of foreign direct investment centers around unsubstantiated fears that foreign direct investment creates economic instability. 179 According to this theory, foreign ownership of important U.S. assets gives other countries the power to destabilize the U.S. economy. 180 In reality, however, foreign direct investment aligns the interests of other [\*192] countries with the United States. 181 If another country owns substantial assets in the United States, its future is tied to the American economy, and that country would be going against its own interests to take any action that may destabilize the American economy. 182

#### And, protectionism sparks great power conflict and exacerbates all global problems.

Patrick, Senior Fellow-CFR, 09 (Stewart, senior fellow and director of the Program on International Institutions and Global Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, “Protecting Free Trade,” National Interest, March 13, 2009, http://nationalinterest.org/article/protecting-free-trade-3060?page=show)

President Obama has committed to working with U.S. trade partners to avoid "escalating protectionism." He is wise to do so. As never before, U.S. national security requires a commitment to open trade. President Obama and his foreign counterparts should reflect on the lessons of the 1930s-and the insights of Cordell Hull. The longest-serving secretary of state in American history (1933-1944), Hull helped guide the United States through the Depression and World War II. He also understood a fundamental truth: "When goods move, soldiers don't." In the 1930s, global recession had catastrophic political consequences-in part because policymakers took exactly the wrong approach. Starting with America's own Smoot Hawley Tariff of 1930, the world's major trading nations tried to insulate themselves by adopting inward looking protectionist and discriminatory policies. The result was a vicious, self-defeating cycle of tit-for-tat retaliation. As states took refuge in prohibitive tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies and competitive devaluations, international commerce devolved into a desperate competition for dwindling markets. Between 1929 and 1933, the value of world trade plummeted from $50 billion to $15 billion. Global economic activity went into a death spiral, exacerbating the depth and length of the Great Depression. The economic consequences of protectionism were bad enough. The political consequences were worse. As Hull recognized, global economic fragmentation lowered standards of living, drove unemployment higher and increased poverty-accentuating social upheaval and leaving destitute populations "easy prey to dictators and desperadoes." The rise of Nazism in Germany, fascism in Italy and militarism in Japan is impossible to divorce from the economic turmoil, which allowed demagogic leaders to mobilize support among alienated masses nursing nationalist grievances. Open economic warfare poisoned the diplomatic climate and exacerbated great power rivalries, raising, in Hull's view, "constant temptation to use force, or threat of force, to obtain what could have been got through normal processes of trade." Assistant Secretary William Clayton agreed: "Nations which act as enemies in the marketplace cannot long be friends at the council table." This is what makes growing protectionism and discrimination among the world's major trading powers today so alarming. In 2008 world trade declined for the first time since 1982. And despite their pledges, seventeen G-20 members have adopted significant trade restrictions. "Buy American" provisions in the U.S. stimulus package have been matched by similar measures elsewhere, with the EU ambassador to Washington declaring that "Nobody will take this lying down." Brussels has resumed export subsidies to EU dairy farmers and restricted imports from the United States and China. Meanwhile, India is threatening new tariffs on steel imports and cars; Russia has enacted some thirty new tariffs and export subsidies. In a sign of the global mood, WTO antidumping cases are up 40 percent since last year. Even less blatant forms of economic nationalism, such as banks restricting lending to "safer" domestic companies, risk shutting down global capital flows and exacerbating the current crisis. If unchecked, such economic nationalism could raise diplomatic tensions among the world's major powers. At particular risk are U.S. relations with China, Washington's most important bilateral interlocutor in the twenty-first century. China has called the "Buy American" provisions "poison"-not exactly how the Obama administration wants to start off the relationship. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner's ill-timed comments about China's currency "manipulation" and his promise of an "aggressive" U.S. response were not especially helpful either, nor is Congress' preoccupation with "unfair" Chinese trade and currency practices. For its part, Beijing has responded to the global slump by rolling back some of the liberalizing reforms introduced over the past thirty years. Such practices, including state subsidies, collide with the spirit and sometimes the law of open trade. The Obama administration must find common ground with Beijing on a coordinated response, or risk retaliatory protectionism that could severely damage both economies and escalate into political confrontation. A trade war is the last thing the United States needs, given that China holds $1 trillion of our debt and will be critical to solving flashpoints ranging from Iran to North Korea. In the 1930s, authoritarian great-power governments responded to the global downturn by adopting more nationalistic and aggressive policies. Today, the economic crisis may well fuel rising nationalism and regional assertiveness in emerging countries. Russia is a case in point. Although some predict that the economic crisis will temper Moscow's international ambitions, evidence for such geopolitical modesty is slim to date. Neither the collapse of its stock market nor the decline in oil prices has kept Russia from flexing its muscles from Ukraine to Kyrgyzstan. While some expect the economic crisis to challenge Putin's grip on power, there is no guarantee that Washington will find any successor regime less nationalistic and aggressive. Beyond generating great power antagonism, misguided protectionism could also exacerbate political upheaval in the developing world. As Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair recently testified, the downturn has already aggravated political instability in a quarter of the world's nations. In many emerging countries, including important players like South Africa, Ukraine and Mexico, political stability rests on a precarious balance. Protectionist policies could well push developing economies and emerging market exporters over the edge. In Pakistan, a protracted economic crisis could precipitate the collapse of the regime and fragmentation of the state. No surprise, then, that President Obama is the first U.S. president to receive a daily economic intelligence briefing, distilling the security implications of the global crisis.

#### And, Unilateral FDI liberalization is key to prevent trade policy backsliding which dooms global economic recovery.

Erixon and Sally, directors-ECIPE, 10 (Fredrik and Razeen, European Centre for International Political Economy, TRADE, GLOBALISATION AND EMERGING PROTECTIONISM SINCE THE CRISIS, http://www.ecipe.org/media/publication\_pdfs/trade-globalisation-and-emerging-protectionism-since-the-crisis.pdf) **[italics are from original source]** We think Mr. Bentham’s world-view will cause damage, not only to domestic economies but also to the world trading system. This will not be a replay of the 1930s, but a replay of the 1970s is a serious prospect. The world is in danger of undoing the market reforms of the 1980s and ‘90s that brought unprecedented prosperity, especially to emerging markets outside the West. Like the 1970s, policy backsliding could prolong a severe downturn and compromise eventual recovery. The short-term challenge is to arrest the slide to Big Government at home and creeping protectionism abroad. The medium-term challenge is to get back on track with trade and FDI liberalisation combined with domestic structural reforms – substantial “unﬁnished business” left before the crisis struck. More, not less, markets and globalisation are what the world needs. That is primarily a matter for *unilateral* action by governments and *competitive emulation* among them. It can be reinforced by international policy cooperation in the WTO, G20 and other fora, but not too much can be expected of cumbersome global-governance mechanisms. Overall, limits to government intervention and a well-functioning market economy are of a piece with open markets, economic globalisation and international political stability.

#### Scenario 2- Economic Collapse:

#### Chinese FDI to the US declined sharply in 2012 but could rebound if the US takes steps to liberalize its national security FDI policy towards China.

Hanemann 12-28 (Theo, research director at the Rhodium Group and leads the firm’s cross-border investment work, Chinese FDI in the US in 2012, http://rhgroup.net/notes/chinese-direct-investmnet-in-the-u-s-in-2012-a-record-year-amid-a-gloomy-fdi-environment)

AGAINST THE GLOBAL TREND The recent growth of Chinese investment is even more remarkable in light of an otherwise bleak FDI picture in the United States. Before the global financial crisis, the United States was the world’s premier destination for foreign direct investment with annual inflows of $200-300 billion. When the crisis hit in 2009 FDI dropped by more than half. In 2010 and 2011 inflows have somewhat stabilized but declined again sharply in 2012 in light of the fragile situation in Europe (which the major source of FDI for the US) and uncertainties for the US growth outlook. Preliminary data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows that FDI dropped by more than 30% in the first three quarters of 2012, which indicates that the full year figure will come in at levels not seen since the crisis year 2009 (Figure 2). These trends suggest that China could follow other Asian economies in becoming an important source of FDI for the United States. China today accounts for less than 1% of total U.S. inward FDI stock, but it has become one of the few bright spots in an otherwise gloomy FDI environment. Compared to five years ago, FDI flows from European economies and Canada were down by more than 50% in the first three quarters of 2012. FDI from Asia was holding up better, and China is among the few countries that invested more in the United States than five years ago – an increase of more than 300% according to official statistics from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Figure 3). These estimates are likely too low as the BEA Balance of Payments figures do not account for flows through offshore financial centers. Figures from Rhodium Group’s China Investment Monitor, which account for such flows, suggest that the increase was even more significant, by nearly 1,300% over five years. Growing investment from China increasingly brings benefits for local economies, for example in the form of employment. Today Chinese firms already employ 29,000 people in the United States, up from less than 10,000 just five years ago. THE RIGHT POLICY RESPONSE Developments in 2012 also underscored the political hurdles in the process of China becoming a major source of FDI for the US. Compared to other emerging FDI exporters in the past like Japan or Korea, China is not a military ally of the United States but sees itself balancing U.S. hegemony. This puts Chinese investors in the spotlight for a range of existing national security concerns related to foreign ownership, among them ownership of critical infrastructure, political and industrial espionage and ownership and proliferation of defense-relevant technologies. In addition to national security risks there are specific concerns about the economic impacts of Chinese investment due to the role of the government in China’s economy and existing asymmetries in market access between China and the United States. Unfortunately the past year was a step back for the political debate on these issues. 2012 saw little progress on substance but instead a lot of political games and populist rhetoric, for example a report by two members of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee that attacks Chinese telecommunications firms and dismisses mitigation options, or efforts by lawmakers and lobbyists to undermine a series of Chinese technology acquisitions, including Wanxiang’s purchase of A123 Systems and BGI Shenzhen’s bid for Complete Genomics. The negative headlines from such politicization are damaging the perception of the U.S. as an investment destination in China, despite U.S. openness and the hard work that is done by governors, mayors and other local officials to promote inward investment. Political games are also a distraction from advancing the debate on important questions such as the risks from Chinese investment in infrastructure or competitive neutrality of state-owned enterprises. If the United States wants to maximize benefits from China’s beginning outward FDI boom, policymakers need to stop beating the drums and instead focus on solutions that allow the US to maintain an open investment environment while addressing real concerns. Otherwise Chinese investors will carry their cash elsewhere, for the example Europe, where Chinese FDI has topped $10 billion for the second year in a row, almost double of what the United States received over the past two years (Figure 4). Europe’s greater attraction can mostly be explained by commercial opportunities including privatization programs and troubled industrial assets, but different national security sensitivities and the perception that Europe is more welcoming to Chinese investment than the United States did play a role too. It is too early to declare Europe the winner in the race for Chinese investment, but it is time for Washington to move past politics, emphasize openness and tackle structural reforms to ensure the United States remains a top destination for FDI from China and elsewhere.

But, CFIUS is increasingly assertive over Chinese energy deals---Casting a shadow over future investment

Crooks-Financial Times-9/11/12

<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4f880244-f90a-11e1-945b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz26DtOgO5Z>

Oil tie-up is test for US deal-watchers

Over the latest three years for which data are publicly available, Cfius required legally binding mitigation measures from only 16 deals out of the 313 that it reviewed. However, the prospect of a review casts a shadow over any potential deal. Cfius has the authority to consider only national security, but lawyers say that this still leaves it with considerable scope for political discretion. The majority of investigations involve manufacturing and technology companies, but natural resources have risen up the committee’s agenda. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 specified that the committee should look at “the potential effects on US critical infrastructure, including major energy assets [and] the long-term projection of US requirements for sources of energy”. Cfius also now seems to have expanded its scope to address factors such as a target’s proximity to sites related to national security. It recently opened an investigation into the acquisition of a US gold mine by a Chinese company, probably because of the site’s proximity to a US Navy air base. The Chinese group has now divested the mine. Deals involving Chinese buyers are a small minority of those reviewed by Cfius, representing only 5 per cent of the 313 looked at in 2008-10, but are often among the most sensitive cases. “Some believe that heightened Cfius scrutiny is unreasonably targeting Chinese investment in the US,” said lawyers from Vinson & Elkins in a recent memo. Paul Marquardt, a partner in the Washington office of Cleary Gottlieb, another law firm, says: “What really drove people to be worried about this was the Cnooc-Unocal deal, which was a disaster, but a political disaster.” There are signs of that political controversy being stirred up again. Charles Schumer, the Democratic senator for New York, wrote in July to Tim Geithner, the Treasury secretary, asking him the block the Nexen deal as a bargaining tactic to secure better treatment for US companies in China. On the question of government ownership, Cnooc Ltd, the bidder for Nexen, is a listed company but 64 per cent owned by Cnooc, its state-owned parent. Cfius has 75 days to come to a decision on the Cnooc bid, which would take it safely beyond the November 6 US election. However, a decision after the election could be delayed by a change of administration. Some tough talk about China from Mitt Romney, the Republican candidate for the presidency, suggests that if elected he might take a harder line. The Cfius decision is not critical to the success or failure of Cnooc’s takeover. If the committee raises objections, the Chinese group could simply dispose of the US assets. The equivalent Canadian authority, government department Industry Canada, is also reviewing the bid but generally takes a more laissez fair approach to foreign takeovers than the US does. Mr Marquardt argues that it is unlikely that Cfius will demand any asset sales. Mr Rubinoff agrees, saying: “It’s not like they are going to make the oil disappear, or affect US energy supplies. So I don’t think there are national security arguments there.” However, if the assets are large enough, then Chinese buyers probably would still be blocked. “Chinese buyers are still different,” says Steve Tredennick of Paul Hastings, another law firm. “The American public is just not ready to have a Chinese national oil company owning assets that are a big deal here in the US.”

#### And, energy restrictions destroy investor confidence, which crushes the dollar and triggers economic recession- the vague CFIUS interpretation of national security chills ALL foreign investment.

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-09 (James, COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY, 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167)

B. National Security and Investor Uncertainty The uncertain interpretation of national security in Exon-Florio, combined with the broad sweep of terms like "energy assets" and "critical infrastructure" make the outcome of the CFIUS process nearly impossible to predict. 150 Continuing to construe the term national security broadly could have a chilling effect on all foreign investment within the United States, as it would send a [\*188] signal that the age of openness to foreign direct investment is coming to a close. 151 Broadly defining national security creates costly uncertainty for foreign investors, as even the most sophisticated legal counsel cannot predict which investments will avoid a politicized CFIUS review. 152 According to Alan Greenspan, regulatory uncertainty deters business investment. 153 Defenders of the current process may point out that presidential vetoes are rare, as there have been none issued since 1990, and some controversial transactions, such as the Alcatel Lucent merger, have recently been approved. 154 Although presidential vetoes of transactions remain relatively scarce, the broad sweep of potential investigations can deter foreign direct investment without the president ever formally vetoing a transaction, as was done in the past to CNOOC and Dubai Ports. 155 Even if the foreign enterprises do not touch upon defense technology, fear of an irrational regulatory regime may discourage deals on the margins. 156 As CFIUS reviews of foreign investment in critical infrastructure continue to be based upon mere political expediency, foreign countries may become wary of investing in the dollar if they see that Congress is willing to limit the amount of investment choices available to them. 157 While a wholesale dumping of American assets is unlikely, continual investigations of relatively innocuous foreign transactions like Unocal and Dubai Ports could lead foreigners to reconsider some of their investments. 158 [\*189] Losing foreign investment in the United States could push the dollar down against other currencies, such as the rising euro. 159 A decline in the dollar fueled by investor pullout could cause interest rates to soar, possibly even worsening the current recession. 160 In an era when the dollar is falling in relation to other currencies, and the trade deficit is continuing to widen, the United States cannot afford to discourage foreign investment. 161 Ironically, although foreign investment is one of the major factors maintaining economic growth, public backlash against such investment only deepens. 162 The housing crisis has exacerbated populist concern over the economy, 163 but while the housing crunch is ongoing, foreign investment is more vital than ever to provide liquidity to American markets. 164

#### And, economic decline causes great power war.

Royal 2010

Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, pg. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of extern conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### We’re on the brink of a double dip recession- boosting investor confidence is key.

Rickards, 12 (James, economist and investment banker with 35 years of experience working in capital markets on Wall Street and the author of NYT Bestselling book Currency Wars: The Making of the Next Global Crisis, “Why We Should Still Be Worried about a Double-Dip Recession,” February 27, 2012, http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2012/02/27/why-we-should-still-be-worried-about-a-double-dip-recession)

The late summer and fall of 2011 was filled with fears of a double-dip recession in the United States coming hard on the heels of the 2007-2009 recession, frequently referred to as the Great Recession. With improved economic news lately including lower unemployment, lower initial claims, higher growth, and higher stock prices, this recession talk has died down. That's why Lakshman Achuthan, the highly respected head of the Economic Cycle Research Institute, caused a stir last week when he repeated his earlier claim that a recession later this year was almost inevitable despite the better news. Achuthan makes the point that improved news on the employment front is a lagging indicator from the end of the last recession and doesn't reveal what's ahead. He adds that higher asset prices in stocks and housing are the expected result of Federal Reserve money printing and don't say much about fundamentals. To make his case for a new recession, he focuses more on year-over-year growth in GDP versus the more popular quarter-over-quarter data, and indicators like changes in industrial production and personal income and spending. [See a collection of political cartoons on the economy.] There's another way to view the economic data since 2007 that casts all recession analyses in a different light. The better analytic mode is to bring back a word mainstream economists have abandoned—depression. When you realize the world has been in a depression since 2007 and will remain so indefinitely based on current policies, talk of recession, double-dip, and economic cycles is seen differently. Economists dislike the concept of depression because it has no well-defined statistical meaning unlike recessions that are conventionally dated using well-understood criteria. They also dismiss the word "depression" because it's, well, too depressing. Economists like to think of themselves as master manipulators of fiscal and monetary policy levers fully capable of avoiding depressions by providing the right amount of "stimulus" at just the right time. They tend to look at a single case—the Great Depression of 1929 to 1940—and a single cause—tight money in 1928, and conclude that easy money is the way to ban depressions from the business cycle. The Great Depression featured a double-dip of its own. Within the start and end dates of the Great Depression, there were two recessions, 1929 to 1933, and 1937 to 1938. In the Keynesian-Monetarist telling, the first of these was caused by tight money, the second was caused by a misguided effort by Franklin Delano Roosevelt to balance the budget. Hence economists added fiscal deficits to their tool kit along with easy money as the all-purpose depression busters. Easy money and big deficits are said to cure all ills. President Obama and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke are following this script to a "T". [Learn about the many faces of Ben Bernanke.] While tight money in the United States almost certainly contributed to the Great Depression, there were other causes including war reparations owed by Germany and war debts owed by England and France. These massive unpayable debts combined with a mispriced return to a poorly constructed gold standard restricted global credit and trade and caused deflationary pressures. This world-in-debt condition closely resembles the world today where overleveraged financial systems in Europe, the United States, and China are all trying to deleverage at once. Less studied than the causes of the Great Depression is the equally interesting subject of why it lasted so long. The best explanation for this is found not in monetary or fiscal policy but in what economists call regime uncertainty. As FDR skittered among price supports, gold confiscation, court packing, and other ad hoc remedies, business executives waited on the sidelines until some consistency and certainty in policy developed. This situation is also the same today. Will the Bush tax cuts expire or not? Will Obamacare be upheld in the courts or not? Will payroll tax cuts and unemployment benefits be extended? Is corporate tax reform coming? This list goes on with the same effect as in the 1930s. Business investment will remain dormant until some certainty returns and, on current form, that may be years away.

#### And, the plan is a quick injection of capital which is critical to economic recovery.

Xu et al 12 (Ting, China and Economy consultant for Bertelsmann Stiftung, with Thieß Petersen and Tianlong Wang, Cash in Hand: Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S. and Germany, June,

http://www.bfna.org/sites/default/files/publications/Cash%20in%20Hand%20Second%20Edition%20final.pdf)

Although Chinese FDI has drawn increasing attention in the U.S. and Germany, China still holds less than 0.2 percent of the FDI stocks in both Germany and the U.S. This fact does not match up to the status of the three countries’ leading roles in the global economy. As China continues its economic development and its per-capita income grows, it will enter a new stage of foreign direct investment where its FDI in the U.S. and the EU will continue to experience strong growth. There will be profound implications to the trend, particularly given the current stage of global financial recovery. While the banking sector institutions continue to deleverage as a result of the financial crisis, unleashing investment potential from China can potentially play a much bigger role in bringing those countries that are facing a credit crunch back to growth.

### Iran Adv- Harv-3:51

#### Removing restrictions on investment in US oil and gas production is the best way to get China to increase their support for Iran sanctions- that’s critical to effective international pressure.

Downs, China fellow at Brookings, 12 (Erica S. Downs is a fellow at the John L. Thorton China Center at The Brookings Institution, “Getting China to Turn on Iran,” July 19, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/getting-china-turn-iran-7215)

Over the past decade, as the United States employed increasingly robust sanctions to gradually ratchet up the pressure on Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions, Washington has struggled with the question of how to elicit more cooperation from China, a major buyer of Iranian crude oil and no fan of sanctions, especially unilateral ones. On June 28, the Obama administration granted China an exemption from U.S. sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) for significantly reducing its crude-oil purchases from the Islamic Republic. This suggests that one of the biggest carrots Washington can offer to China in exchange for greater support for the U.S. sanctions regimen is expanded opportunities for China’s national oil companies (NOCs) to invest in oil and natural-gas exploration and production in the United States. The greater the stakes that China’s NOCs have in the United States, the thinking goes, the greater the chance they will think twice about doing business in Iran.

The Chinese government responded to the new U.S. sanctions signed into law by President Obama on December 31, 2011, by saying Washington should not expect any cooperation from Beijing. Over the past six months, officials from China’s foreign ministry have repeatedly stated that China’s energy trade with—and investment in—Iran do not violate the various United Nations Security Council resolutions on Iran and that the new U.S. sanctions would not affect China-Iran energy relations. Despite Beijing’s implication that China would continue to import oil from Iran at 2011 levels (more than 550,000 barrels a day), the main Chinese buyer of Iranian crude oil, Sinopec, responded to the new U.S. sanctions by dramatically cutting its purchases from Iran by 25 percent in the first five months of 2012. At the end of every year, Chinese oil traders negotiate their supply contracts with National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for the following year. The commencement of their negotiations in late 2011 coincided with growing support in Washington, especially on Capitol Hill, for ratcheting up the pressure on Iran by subjecting foreign firms that do business with the CBI—the primary clearinghouse for Iranian oil transactions—to U.S. financial sanctions. When China’s oil traders sat down at the negotiating table with their Iranian counterparts, Iran’s increasing international isolation was palpable. Sinopec pushed for lower prices and a longer credit period, while NIOC insisted on higher prices and a shorter credit period. The two companies did not sign a new contract until late March 2012 (with Sinopec reportedly extracting some concessions, which have not been disclosed publicly), causing the plunge in China’s crude oil imports from Iran. Moreover, Sinopec recently revealed that it turned down offers to buy additional volumes of Iranian crude at discounted prices. After President Obama signed the new sanctions into law, there was some concern in Washington that the Chinese would undermine his tough policy by purchasing at a discount all of the crude that would otherwise have gone to European and Asian buyers in the absence of sanctions. Sinopec, however, had compelling reasons to decline the opportunity to increase its purchases from Iran; the company does not want to jeopardize its chance to expand in the United States, where it already has signed a deal to invest more than $2 billion in shale assets owned by Devon Energy and is looking to buy assets from Chesapeake Energy. The chair~~man~~ of Sinopec, Fu Chengyu, is acutely aware of how getting on the wrong side of politics in Washington can scuttle a deal; he was the chairman of China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) when that company made its ill-fated bid for the U.S. oil company Unocal in 2005. Sinopec is not the only Chinese oil company with an incentive to choose the U.S. market over the Iranian one. Its domestic peers, CNOOC and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), also find the United States to be an attractive investment destination. First, all three companies are eager to gain shale-gas technology and operational expertise through partnerships with U.S. firms. On paper, China has considerable shale-gas resources. The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that China’s technically recoverable shale-gas resources are 50 percent greater than those of the United States. But China’s NOCs lack the technology and operational expertise to develop them. Second, they want to expand reserves and production, and an increasing number of opportunities to do so are now in the United States, thanks to the boom in America’s unconventional oil and natural-gas production. Finally, the turmoil in Middle East and North Africa over the past two years has prompted China’s NOCs to seek less risky operating environments. Indeed, Sinopec’s domestic peers also are gravitating toward the United States and away from Iran. CNOOC, which has signed contracts committing it to invest $3.4 billion in Chesapeake Energy’s shale-gas assets in the United States, had a $15 billion contract suspended by the Iranians for lack of progress. China National Petroleum Corporation, which similarly had a $4.7 billion contract frozen by the Iranians for its failure to start work, also is looking for opportunities to partner with U.S. companies in shale-gas projects. Moreover, China’s NOCs have not “backfilled” any projects abandoned by European and Japanese oil companies after their home governments implemented tighter unilateral sanctions in 2010. It isn’t just China’s NOCs that seem to be backing away from Iran in a bid for access to the U.S. market. Consider the announcement made last year by the Chinese telecommunications firm Huawei Technologies that it was planning to scale back its operations in Iran. Although these operations complied with U.S. and European Union laws, there was at least a partial motivation to keep open prospects for doing business in the United States and Europe. The ability of the United States to secure additional Chinese cooperation may depend in part on the scale of the investments made by China’s NOCs in the United States. The more money these companies pump into the American market, the more likely they are to refrain from doing deals with Iran that might jeopardize those business prospects. Consequently, creating a more welcoming environment for Chinese investments just might have a geopolitical payoff in the form of greater Chinese compliance with Iran sanctions. Moreover, letting China’s NOCs take the lead in complying with—or at least not undercutting—U.S. sanctions on Iran is politically palatable to Beijing. Chinese officials can maintain their public opposition to U.S. sanctions while avoiding increased tensions with Washington over the Iranian nuclear issue. This dual stance is attributable to the business decisions made by China’s NOCs.

#### Allowing Chinese majority shares of US oil and gas production is critical garnering Chinese compliance on Iran. Only the signal of the plan solves Iran nuclearization.

Downs, Brookings China Fellow, October ‘12 (Erica, CHINA, IRAN AND THE NEXEN DEAL, OPTIONS POLITIQUES, http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct12/downs.pdf)

Meanwhile the expansion of the Chinese NOC footprint in the United States has coincided with the shrinking of their presence in Iran. CNOOC has pulled out of a $16-billion project to develop Iran’s North Pars natural gas ﬁ eld. The Iranians have frozen a $4.7-billion contract held by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for the development of Phase 11 of the South Pars natural gas ﬁ eld because of CNPC’s failure to start work. Sinopec is behind schedule in developing the Yadavaran oil ﬁ eld. Nor have China’s NOCs “backﬁlled” projects abandoned by European and Japanese oil companies after their home governments implemented tighter unilateral sanctions against Iran in 2010 and the Obama administration indicated that taking over such projects was a red line not to be crossed. It would be more than diplomatically awkward for Washington to lean on China over its projects in Iran and then block its attempts to compensate for the loss of those opportunities by investing in North America. While the Chinese oil majors’ waning enthusiasm for Iran is partially due to the country’s difﬁcult operating and investment climate, it almost certainly reﬂects their ambitions to expand here. One way for Washington — and Ottawa — to spur China’s NOCs to continue their retreat from Iran is to continue to welcome them into North America, not only as passive investors but also as owners. Rolling out the red carpet for China’s NOCs would not only generate much-needed capital for the development of North American oil and natural gas resources, but it may also pay the geopolitical dividend of increased Chinese compliance on the issue of Iran. The road to curbing Iran’s nuclear program may run through the headquarters of CNOOC, CNPC and Sinopec.

#### Iranian nuclearization makes nuclear war inevitable in the Middle East- even small conflicts could escalate to all out war.

Kahl, Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, 12 (Colin, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East and Senior Fellow, the Center for a New American Security, Iran and the Bomb, Foreign Affairs; Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 91 Issue 5, p157-162)

Waltz writes that "policymakers and citizens in the Arab world, Europe, Israel, and the United States should take comfort from the fact that history has shown that where nuclear capabilities emerge, so, too, does stability." In fact, the historical record suggests that competition between a nuclear-armed Iran and its principal adversaries would likely follow the pattern known as "the stability-instability paradox," in which the supposed stability created by mutually assured destruction generates greater instability by making provocations, disputes, and conflict below the nuclear threshold seem safe. During the Cold War, for example, nuclear deterrence prevented large-scale conventional or nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, however, the superpowers experienced several direct crises and faced off in a series of bloody proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and elsewhere. A recent statistical analysis by the political scientist Michael Horowitz demonstrated that inexperienced nuclear powers tend to be more crisis-prone than other types of states, and research by another political scientist, Robert Rauchhaus, has found that nuclear states are more likely to engage in low-level militarized disputes with one another, even if they are less likely to engage in full-scale war. If deterrence operates the way Waltz expects it to, a nuclear-armed Iran might reduce the risk of a major conventional war among Middle Eastern states. But history suggests that Tehran's development of nuclear weapons would encourage Iranian adventurism, leading to more frequent and intense crises in the Middle East. Such crises would entail some inherent risk of a nuclear exchange resulting from a miscalculation, an accident, or an unauthorized use -- a risk that currently does not exist at all. The threat would be particularly high in the initial period after Iran joined the nuclear club. Once the superpowers reached rough nuclear parity during the Cold War, for example, the number of direct crises decreased, and the associated risks of nuclear escalation abated. But during the early years of the Cold War, the superpowers were involved in several crises, and on at least one occasion -- the 1962 Cuban missile crisis -- they came perilously close to nuclear war. Similarly, a stable deterrent relationship between Iran, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other, would likely emerge over time, but the initial crisis-prone years would be hair-raising. Although all sides would have a profound interest in not allowing events to spiral out of control, the residual risk of inadvertent escalation stemming from decades of distrust and hostility, the absence of direct lines of communication, and organizational mistakes would be nontrivial -- and the consequences of even a low-probability outcome could be devastating.

#### Iranian nuclearization causes regional and global arms racing.

Cirincione 06 (Joseph, Sr. Assoc. & Director @ the Non-Proliferation Project @ the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Summer, SAIS Review, “A New Non-Proliferation Strategy”)

The danger posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran or North Korea is not that either country would be liable to use these weapons to attack the United States, the nations of Europe, or other countries. Iran, for example, would likely decide to build nuclear weapons only as a means to defend itself from the aggression of other nations. Iranian leaders, like the leaders of other states, would be deterred from using nuclear weapons in a first strike by the certainty of swift and massive retaliation. The danger is that certain actions may be viewed by Iran as a defensive move, however they would trigger dangerous reactions from other states in the region. A nuclear reaction chain could ripple through a region and across the globe, triggering weapon decisions in several, perhaps many, other states. Such developments could weaken Iran's security, not increase it. With these rapid developments and the collapse of existing norms could come increased regional tensions, possibly leading to regional wars and to nuclear catastrophe.3 Existing regional nuclear tensions already pose serious risks. The decades-long conflict between India and Pakistan has made South Asia the region most likely to witness the first use of nuclear weapons since World War II. An active missile race is under way between the two nations, even as India and China continue their rivalry. In Northeast Asia, North Korea's nuclear capabilities remain shrouded in uncertainty but presumably continue to advance. Miscalculation or misunderstanding could bring nuclear war to the Korean peninsula. In the Middle East, Iran's declared peaceful nuclear energy program, together with Israel's nuclear arsenal and the chemical weapons of other Middle Eastern states, adds grave volatility to an already conflict-prone region. If Iran were to decide at some later date to build nuclear weapons, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, or others might initiate or revive nuclear weapon programs. It is entirely possible that the Middle East could go from a region with one nuclear weapon state, to one with two, three, or five such states within a decade-compounded by the existing political and territorial disputes still unresolved.4

#### This risks global nuclear conflict- new prolif risks theft, unauthorized use, terrorism, and crisis escalation.

Busch, Professor of Government-Christopher Newport, 04 (Nathan, “No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation” p 281-314)

Summing Up: Will the Further Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be Better or Worse? This study has revealed numerous reasons to be skeptical that the spread of nuclear weapons would increase international stability by helping prevent conventional and nuclear wars. Because there is reason to suspect that emerging NWSs will not handle their nuclear weapons and fissile materials any better than current NWSs have, we should conclude that the further spread of nuclear weapons will tend to undermine international stability in a number of ways. First, because emerging NWSs will probably rely on inadequate command-and-control systems, the risks of accidental and unauthorized use will tend to be fairly high. Second, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt systems that allow for rapid response, the risks of inadvertent war will also be high, especially during crisis situations. Third, because emerging NWSs will tend to adopt MPC&A systems that are vulnerable to overt attacks and insider thefts, the further spread of nuclear weapons could lead to rapid, destabilizing proliferation and increased opportunities for nuclear terrorism. Finally, there is reason to question whether nuclear weapons will in fact increase stability. Although nuclear weapons can cause states to be cautious about undertaking actions that can be interpreted as aggressive and can prevent states from attacking one another, this may not always be the case. While the presence of nuclear weapons did appear to help constrain U.S. and Soviet actions during the Cold War, this has generally not held true in South Asia. Many analysts conclude that Pakistan invaded Indian-controlled Kargil in 1999, at least in part, because it was confident that its nuclear weapons would deter a large-scale Indian retaliation. The Kargil war was thus in part caused by the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Thus, the optimist argument that nuclear weapons will help prevent conventional war has not always held true. Moreover, this weakness in the optimist argument should also cause us to question the second part of their argument, that nuclear weapons help prevent nuclear war as well. Conventional wars between nuclear powers can run serious risks of escalating to nuclear war."5 Based on a careful examination of nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan, as well as preliminary studies of the programs in Iraq, North Korea, and Iran, this book concludes that the optimists' arguments about the actions that emerging NWSs will probably take are overly optimistic. While it is impossible to prove that further nuclear proliferation will necessarily precipitate nuclear disasters, the potential consequences are too severe to advocate nuclear weapons proliferation in hopes that the stability predicted by the optimists will indeed occur.

#### Sanctions work- evidence suggests they will bring Iran back to the negotiating table.

Kahl 12 (Colin, Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, Not Time to Attack Iran, Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr2012, Vol. 91, Issue 2)

 In making the case for preventive war as the least bad option, Kroenig dismisses any prospect of finding a diplomatic solution to the U.S.-Iranian standoff. He concludes that the Obama administration's dual-track policy of engagement and pressure has failed to arrest Iran's march toward a bomb, leaving Washington with no other choice but to bomb Iran. But this ignores the severe economic strain, isolation, and technical challenges that Iran is experiencing. After years of dismissing the economic effects of sanctions, senior Iranian officials now publicly complain about the intense pain the sanctions are producing. And facing the prospect of U.S. sanctions against Iran's central bank and European actions to halt Iranian oil imports, Tehran signaled in early January some willingness to return to the negotiating table. Washington must test this willingness and, in so doing, provide Iran with a clear strategic choice: address the concerns of the international community regarding its nuclear program and see its isolation lifted or stay on its current path and face substantially higher costs. In framing this choice, Washington must be able to assert that like-minded states are prepared to implement oil-related sanctions, and the Obama administration should continue to emphasize that all options, including military action, remain on the table.

### China Gas- SCS, H20, pollution-4:30

#### Contention \_\_ is Chinese Gas:

#### China is limiting itself to “hands off” oil and gas deals – these small partnerships don’t secure technical expertise to develop Chinese shale – this puts them decades behind gas targets

Mandel 7-17 (Jenny, Reporter for EnergyWire, a daily publication covering the unconventional oil and gas sectors, Previous positions with E&E include editing Land Letter and writing news and feature stories for Greenwire, ClimateWire, and other news outlets, “Will U.S. shale technology make the leap across the Pacific?,” EnergyWire: Tuesday, July 17, 2012, http://www.eenews.net/public/energywire/2012/07/17/1)

Modes of tech transfer Despite the challenges, the allure of a massive new domestic energy source has the Chinese government and private and state-owned companies moving cautiously toward development. Today, virtually all of the key intellectual property behind shale gas extraction lies with North American companies, and one of the first steps the Chinese have taken is to pour money into U.S. and Canadian ventures where those technologies are in use. In 2010 and 2011, China National Offshore Oil Corp. (CNOOC) paid $2.3 billion for partial stakes in plays by Chesapeake Energy Corp. in Texas, Wyoming and Colorado. Earlier this year, Sinopec bought into Oklahoma City-based Devon Energy Corp.'s holdings across Louisiana, Mississippi, Colorado, Ohio and Michigan in a $2.5 billion deal. Chinese companies have also aggressively pursued investment deals in Canadian shale projects. But Johns Hopkins' Kong said attempts by Chinese companies to negotiate North American on-the-job training have been blocked. The deal with Chesapeake, for example, limited the interaction of CNOOC personnel with sensitive technologies by restricting the company's right to send workers into gas fields, Kong said. "The Chinese companies have agreed deliberately not to send their oil workers to American gas fields and not to participate in boardroom decisions," Kong said. "The Chinese companies have agreed to this long-term, slow, gradual approach to gaining know-how in the North American energy sector." The caution stems mostly from a political firestorm that broke out when, in 2005, CNOOC tried to buy Unocal Corp. in an $18.5 billion deal that was eventually withdrawn in the face of opposition from Congress. Since then, there has been a general awareness among Chinese players of the need to move slowly and avoid raising red flags (E&ENews PM, Aug. 2, 2005). So what do Chinese investors gain from these North American investments, then, if not direct access to fracking technologies? "By investing in the U.S. ... they benefit from the spill-over effect," Kong said. They have some personnel involved with the projects, even if they're not learning the nitty-gritty of how to develop a fracking plan, and may be able to pick up some very high-level management expertise that is relevant at home. Home or away? Jane Nakano, a fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Energy and National Security program, stressed that investing in U.S. projects is not China's most effective means of technology transfer, especially given companies' failure to crack the personnel firewall. "If it's just a matter of getting profits from what comes out of each well or each project, then the amount of money they're pouring into North America does not make economic sense," she said. Rather, Nakano said Chinese gas interests would be best served by opening the domestic market to foreigners. "The most straightforward way would be for them to involve Western or non-Chinese technology holders more proactively" at home, she said. There has been limited involvement by major non-Chinese companies. In 2007, Houston-based Newfield Exploration Co. did a resource study with PetroChina. Royal Dutch Shell PLC has worked with PetroChina under a broader partnership agreement. And Exxon Mobil Corp. has had limited dealings with Sinopec. The first round of bidding on government shale gas leases, which occurred last summer, was open only to state-owned companies, and the final bids awarded parcels to just two large firms. There is speculation that the second round, which could come as early as this month, will expand participation to privately owned companies or even foreign bidders. There are other configurations that could also serve to carry the needed intellectual property into Chinese gas fields. In addition to joint ventures in North America or China with the supermajors, firms could hire foreign service companies to carry out work in China, observing their approach. Chinese companies or government interests could buy up some of the cash-strapped U.S. gas companies that are struggling to stay afloat until U.S. prices rise again and bring their expertise back to the Far East. They could buy U.S. shale resources -- even small ones like those held by individual property owners -- outright, then dictate the terms of development so as to ensure full access to the technologies used. Outside of industry, government-to-government interactions tout cooperation on shale gas, among other forms of energy that could help both U.S. and Chinese carbon emissions reduction efforts. And Chinese scientists work to develop home-grown strategies for shale gas production modeled on what has worked elsewhere. The University of Alberta's Jiang said Chinese shale interests, including both government and industry players, are undecided on how to move forward and how much to focus on domestic development versus lower-cost production overseas. "I don't think they have reached a conclusion one way or the other," he said. As a result, the country pursues "a two legs walking approach -- on the one side they want to explore domestic possibilities, on the other they want to explore possibilities with lower ... prices" elsewhere. That likely means a timeline of a decade, at a minimum, before Chinese shale gas resources are well-understood and a clear path to their development emerges, and potentially as long as two decades, observers say. In the meantime, the Chinese will continue to pursue contracts for natural gas imports to satisfy the strong and growing demand.

#### US gas companies currently negotiate passive deals for China because of CFIUS restrictions.

Knowledge @ Wharton 12 (China's Underground Race for Shale Gas, aug 21, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/arabic/article.cfm?articleid=2851)

Meanwhile, in the U.S., shale gas leaders, such as Devon Energy and Chesapeake Energy, have been reluctant to impart their technology know-how to the firms' Chinese investors, Sinopec and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), respectively, notes Bo Kong, assistant research professor at the Johns Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in Washington, D.C. The Chinese and U.S. companies designed deals giving the Chinese passive, minority stakes to avoid disapproval by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS), which axed CNOOC's 2005 bid for Unocal. Also, the Sinopec-Devon and CNOOC-Chesapeake deals were struck at a time when the U.S. shale gas industry was at its peak. Today, with gas prices declining and companies such as Chesapeake struggling financially, Chinese companies may be able to negotiate better terms, says CATF's Sung.

#### Only the US has the expertise necessary for China to develop its shale resources- increased Chinese access to US drilling techniques and regulatory methods is critical.

Forbes, manager- Shale Gas Initiative at the World Resources Institute, 12 (Sarah, also the Senior Associate for the Climate and Energy Program at the World Resources Institute, HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION: “CHINA’S GLOBAL QUEST FOR RESOURCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES; CHINA’S PROSPECTS FOR SHALE GAS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.,” January 26, http://pdf.wri.org/testimony/forbes\_testimony\_china\_shale\_gas\_2012-01-26.pdf)

Are there risks as well as opportunities for U.S. companies? From a global perspective, the oil and gas industry is integrated; companies work together on projects all over the world, owning shares in projects and hiring service providers as required for operations. Because of the variation in geology, most of what is needed to develop any oil or gas play is local “know-how,” not technology that is subject to patents. These unique features of the globalized industry result in less dependency on intellectual property protection and the risks of sharing technologies abroad as compared with other industries. For example, while the basic drilling and fracturing technologies needed for shale gas development are relatively uniform, the extraction methodologies depend most heavily on the site-specific geological features of the shale play being developed. Horizontal drilling first occurred in the United States in 1929 and fracing has been performed since 1949 39 . Geological factors that are unique to each well site (e.g., natural gas content, natural fractures of the rock, fracturing ability of the source rock) impact the staging of the fractures, the pressure of the hydraulic fracturing, and the fracturing fluid mixture. It is the experience gained from working many drill sites, in different basins and plays, which is the driving force behind U.S. shale gas development. Chinese companies currently possess the ability to drill wells horizontally and have some experience with fracing 40 , but operators and service providers in the United States currently have a clear global advantage based on the substantial experience with drilling and fracing shales to produce gas and the know-how to use these techniques effectively to maximize output 41 . This being said, the oil industry in China is a very domestic business (especially onshore) and has historically provided international companies with very limited access to onshore resources. Any international involvement typically comes from the creation of partnerships between Chinese companies and foreign companies, which is already happening with shale plays in China, as demonstrated by the PetroChina-Shell and CNOOC-BP JVs. A key question is whether the future shale gas industry in China will be modeled after the offshore oil industry (which includes more JVs) or the onshore oil and gas industry. Future cooperation between governments and businesses should not be limited to financial investments or knowledge sharing on operational practices. Although the United States currently stands as the only country with domestic experience in large-scale shale gas development, the experiences have not been all positive. U.S. regulatory structures, information flow, and enforcement capacities have generally not kept pace with the speed of development in shale formations. Stakeholders affected by U.S. shale gas development have not reached agreement on the risks associated with fracing, although experts agree that practices and regulations should be improved in order for the United States to develop its shale gas resources in an environmentally and socially responsible manner 42 . The growing understanding within state governments of both the level of environmental risks and how to manage them are valuable experiences for Chinese regulators and industrial entities to be aware of and take into account while pursuing and designing Chinese domestic development.

#### Chinese shale development key to displace their coal use—renewables cant be scaled up fast enough.

Hanger 12 (John, Special Counsel at the law firm Eckert Seamans, and former Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, “China Gets Cracking on Fracking: The Best Environmental News Of The Year?,” Aug 14, http://johnhanger.blogspot.com/2012/08/china-gets-cracking-on-fracking-good.html)

China sits on natural gas reserves that are estimated to be 50% higher than the massive gas reserves in the USA. http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/energy/2012/08/120808-china-shale-gas/. Despite this gargantuan gas resource, coal provides China 80% of its electricity, compared to 34% in the USA, as of May 2012. Why the difference? The shale gas boom that is now more than 10 years long in the USA is just getting started in China and so the Chinese remain heavily reliant on coal to make electricity and for their total energy. Around the world, the basic energy choice is coal or gas. China is just the biggest example of this fundamental fact. China's reliance on coal means that its economic growth brings skyrocketing carbon emissions and other air pollution. Indeed, Chinese air quality is infamous around the world, and smog has been so thick that Beijing airport has been unable to land planes for short periods. As of 2011, China was responsible for 29% of the world's carbon emissions, while the US produced 16%, even though the US economy is still considerably bigger than China's. Moreover, US carbon emissions are declining to 1992 levels, but China's emissions skyrocket. Though China is building substantial new wind, solar, and nuclear generation, those investments are not enough to cut Chinese coal consumption, given economic growth that is still 7% in what some describe as an economic slowdown. Shale gas, however, could be big enough to actually displace significant amounts of coal in China. More gas in China means less mercury, soot. lead, smog, and carbon emissions. China's energy plans call for shale gas to provide 6% of its total energy as soon as 2020. If it achieves that goal, China will avoid more than 500 million tons of carbon pollution per year or about 1.5% of today's total carbon emissions.

#### Increasing demand for Chinese coal production causes water shortages which threaten economic collapse and political instability.

Schneider 11 (Keith, senior editor for Circle of Blue-a nonprofit focusing on resource shortages founded in 2000, Choke Point: China—Confronting Water Scarcity and Energy Demand in the World’s Largest Country, Feb 15, http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2011/world/choke-point-china%E2%80%94confronting-water-scarcity-and-energy-demand-in-the-world%E2%80%99s-largest-country/)

By any measure, conventional and otherwise, China’s tireless advance to international economic prominence has been nothing less than astonishing. Over the last decade alone, 70 million new jobs emerged from an economy that this year, according to the World Bank and other authorities, generated the world’s largest markets for cars, steel, cement, glass, housing, energy, power plants, wind turbines, solar panels, highways, high-speed rail systems, airports, and other basic supplies and civic equipment to support a modern economy. Yet, like a tectonic fault line, underlying China’s new standing in the world is an increasingly fierce competition between energy and water that threatens to upend China’s progress. Simply put, according to Chinese authorities and government reports, China’s demand for energy, particularly for coal, is outpacing its freshwater supply. Students of Chinese history and geography, of course, understand that tight supplies of fresh water are nothing new in a nation where 80 percent of the rainfall and snowmelt occurs in the south, while just 20 percent of the moisture occurs in the mostly desert regions of the north and west. What’s new is that China’s surging economic growth is prompting the expanding industrial sector, which consumes 70 percent of the nation’s energy, to call on the government to tap new energy supplies, particularly the enormous reserves of coal in the dry north. The problem, say government officials, is that there is not enough water to mine, process, and consume those reserves, and still develop the modern cities and manufacturing centers that China envisions for the region. “Water shortage is the most important challenge to China right now, the biggest problem for future growth,” said Wang Yahua, deputy director of the Center for China Study at Tsinghua University in Beijing. “It’s a puzzle that the country has to solve.” The consequences of diminishing water reserves and rising energy demand have been a special focus of Circle of Blue’s attention for more than a year. In 2010, in our Choke Point: U.S. series, Circle of Blue found that rising energy demand and diminishing freshwater reserves are two trends moving in opposing direction across America. Moreover, the speed and force of the confrontation is occurring in the places where growth is highest and water resources are under the most stress—California, the Southwest, the Rocky Mountain West, and the Southeast. Modernization vs. Water Resources In December, we expanded our reporting to China. Circle of Blue—in collaboration with the China Environment Forum (CEF) at the Washington-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars—dispatched four teams of researchers and photographers to 10 Chinese provinces. Their assignment: to report on how the world’s largest nation and second-largest economy is achieving its swift modernization, despite scarce and declining reserves of clean fresh water. In essence, Circle of Blue and CEF completed a national tour of the extensive water circulatory system and vast energy production musculature that makes China go. The result of our reporting is Choke Point: China. In a dozen chapters—starting today and posted weekly online through April—Choke Point: China will report in text, photographs, and interactive graphics the powerful evidence of a potentially ruinous confrontation between growth, water, and fuel that is already visible across China and is virtually certain to grow more dire over the next decade. Choke Point: China, though, is not a narrative of doom. Rather, our journalists and photographers found a powerful narrative in two parts and never before told. The first important finding—left largely unsaid in and outside China—is how effectively the national and provincial governments enacted and enforced a range of water conservation and efficiency measures. Circle of Blue met the engineers, plant managers, and workers who operate China’s robust and often state-of-the-art energy and water installations. We interviewed the academics and government executives who oversee the globally significant water conservation policies and practices that have been essential to China’s new prosperity. Those policies, we found, sharply reduced waste, shifted water from agriculture to industry, and slowed the growth in national water consumption. Though China’s economy has grown almost eight-fold since the mid-1990s, water consumption has increased 15 percent, or 1 percent annually. China’s major cities, including Beijing, are retrofitting their sewage treatment systems to recycle wastewater for use in washing clothes, flushing toilets, and other grey-water applications. Here in Baotou, a desert city of 1.5 million in Inner Mongolia, the giant Baotou Iron and Steel Company plant, one of the world’s largest, produces 10 million metric tons of steel annually in a region that receives mere inches of rainfall a year. The plant—which is 49 square kilometers and employs 50,000 workers—recycles 98 percent of its water, a requirement of a 1997 law that prompted owners of industrial plants to conserve water. Three Trends Converging We also discovered a second vital narrative that most industrial executives and government authorities we interviewed were either not fully aware of or were reluctant to acknowledge: the tightening choke point between rising energy demand and declining freshwater reserves that forms the central story line of the next era of China’s unfolding development. Stripped to its essence, China’s globally significant choke point is caused by three converging trends:Production of coal has tripled since 2000 to 3.15 billion metric tons a year. Government analysts project that China’s energy companies will need to produce an additional billion metric tons of coal annually by 2020, representing a 30 percent increase. Fresh water needed for mining, processing, and consuming coal accounts for the largest share of industrial water use in China, or roughly 120 billion cubic meters a year, a fifth of all the water consumed nationally. Though national conservation policies have helped to limit increases, water consumption nevertheless has climbed to a record 599 billion cubic meters annually, which is 50 billion cubic meters (13 trillion gallons) more than in 2000. Over the next decade, according to government projections, China’s water consumption, driven in large part by increasing coal-fired power production, may reach 670 billion cubic meters annually — 71 billion cubic meters a year more than today. China’s total water resource, according to the National Bureau of Statistics, has dropped 13 percent since the start of the century. In other words China’s water supply is 350 billion cubic meters (93 trillion gallons) less than it was at the start of the century. That’s as much water lost to China each year as flows through the mouth of the Mississippi River in nine months. Chinese climatologists and hydrologists attribute much of the drop to climate change, which is disrupting patterns of rain and snowfall. “It’s just impossible, if you haven’t lived it or experienced it, to understand change in China over the past 25 years, and especially since 1992,” said Kang Wu, a senior fellow and China energy scholar at East-West Center in Hawaii. “It’s a new world. It’s a new country. The worry in China and in the rest of the world is can they sustain it? They want to double the size of the economy again in 10 years. How can they do that? It’s a paradox from an economic point of view. They need a resource balance to meet demand, short-term and long-term. If you look out 10, 20, 30 years, it just looks like it’s not possible.” Rapid GDP Growth Will Continue In interviews, national and provincial government leaders, as well as energy industry executives, said China has every intention of continuing its 10 percent annual economic growth. “We believe that this is possible and we can do this with new technology, new ways to use water and energy,” said Xiangkun Ren, who oversees the coal-to-liquids program for Shenhua Group, the largest coal company in the world. Xiangkun acknowledged that avoiding the looming choke point will not be easy. The tightening loop is already visible in the jammed rail lines, huge coal truck traffic jams, and buckling roads that Circle of Blue encountered in Inner Mongolia—the country’s largest coal producer—and which are responsible for transporting billions of tons of coal from existing mines to market. Energy prices are steadily rising, putting new inflationary pressure on the economy. Even as China has launched enormous new programs of solar, wind, hydro, and seawater-cooled nuclear power, all of which use much less fresh water, energy market conditions will get worse without new supplies of coal, the source of 70 percent of the nation’s energy. China’s economy and the new social contract with its citizens, who have come to expect rising incomes and improving opportunities, is at risk, say some authorities.

#### Chinese economic collapse causes Asian and Middle East conflict- China will turn outwardly aggressive.

Newmeyer 09 DR. JACQUELINE NEWMYER - LONG TERM STRATEGY GROUP- THE CENTER FOR NATIONAL POLICY “ECONOMIC CRISIS: IMPACT ON CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION” APRIL 8, 2009, http://cnponline.org/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/12503

 So I think either way, either because of the insecurity that is stoked by what’s happening inside China and perceptions about economic slowdown, and/or because of demonization issues and popular discourse, I think that there’s a real chance that the Chinese leadership could feel compelled, for reasons of state security, to take actions that appear more belligerent abroad. And that could have effects leading up to possibly even military conflict or the use of military force against outside actors in addition to whatever force is used inside China to maintain stability. So I think that would be a real, kind of operational test for the PLA, a modernized force now. So, in conclusion, what struck me in thinking about and preparing for this presentation was there was less divergence between the sort of steady state and the more dramatic impact of the economic downturn scenarios than I expected. Either way, I think there is a chance, or a likelihood, of increased friction between China and other external countries, particular countries, that would affected in the case of increased arm transfers, actors in the Middle East would be affected, possibly also the U.S., and in the case of more serious concern about internal unrest in China, I think China’s relations with the West, and with India, or with Japan would be implicated there. So I think contrary to our hopes which would be that the downturn would have the effect of causing China to turn inwards and reduce the chances for any kind of external problem, I think, in fact, there’s reason to think, and to worry, that the downturn would lead to a greater chance of conflict abroad for China.

#### And, economic decline causes war.

Royal 2010 Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises,” in Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, pg. 213-215

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of extern conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defense behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crisis could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland’s (1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that ‘future expectation of trade’ is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behavious of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations, However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crisis could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favor. Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflict self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002. P. 89) Economic decline has been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. ‘Diversionary theory’ suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increase incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a ‘rally around the flag’ effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlated economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels. This implied connection between integration, crisis and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

#### And, pollution from coal causes environmental protests that threaten CCP rule.

LeVine 12 (Steve, author of The Oil and the Glory, Foreign Policy contributor, CHINA The Cost of Coal , The Weekly Wrap -- Aug. 3, 2012, <http://oilandglory.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/03/the_weekly_wrap_aug_3_2012_part_i>)

China's moment of coal truth: A question that has vexed us for some time is when we will witness an inflection point in ordinary Chinese tolerance for the coal-borne pollution in their air. At that time, we have argued, we will likely also see a sharp turn away from coal consumption, and more use of cleaner natural gas -- Communist Party leaders will see to it for reasons of political survival. With this shift will come important knock-on events, including a materially smaller increase in projected global CO2 emissions. According to Bernstein Research, that tipping point may now be past. In a note to clients yesterday, Michael W. Parker and Alex Leung argue that the moment of truth became apparent to them in two pollution protests over the last month in the cities of Shifang and Qidong. In the former, violent July protests resulted in the scrapping of a planned metals plant; in the latter last week, the ax fell on a waste pipeline connected to a paper mill, again because of an agitated local citizenry. Their paper's title -- Who Are You Going to Believe: Me or Your Smog-Irritated, Burning, Weeping, Lying Eyes? -- is a reference to what the authors regard as a general outside blindness to a conspicuous new political day. One reason no one is noticing, they say, is the curse of history itself. The record of surging economies -- comparing China with, say Japan -- suggests that a burning aspiration for cleaner surroundings over economic betterment should reach critical mass in China only in about a decade. Yet, "the clear signal from Shifang and Qidong is that China has reached the point today, where the population is ready to take to the streets in protest of worsening environmental conditions," the two researchers write. They go on: Since we all agree that the Chinese government is focused on social harmony, the practical implication is that the government will do whatever is required to ensure that people aren't in the streets protesting not just food prices or lack of jobs, but also the environment. Few observers seem to classify the environment as the kind of issue that could excite the Chinese population into the street or the kind of issue that could result in changing political decision making and economic outcomes. And yet that is exactly what we are seeing.

#### Those pollution protests causes Chinese instability and CCP lashout

Nankivell 05 (Nathan, Senior Researcher @ Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, China Brief Vol: 5 Issue: 22, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=3904&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=195&no\_cache=1)

As the impact of pollution on human health becomes more obvious and widespread, it is leading to greater political mobilization and social unrest from those citizens who suffer the most. The latest statement from the October 2005 Central Committee meeting in Shanghai illustrates Beijing’s increasing concern regarding the correlation between unrest and pollution issues. There were more than 74,000 incidents of protest and unrest recorded in China in 2004, up from 58,000 the year before (Asia Times, November 16, 2004). While there are no clear statistics linking this number of protests, riots, and unrest specifically to pollution issues, the fact that pollution was one of four social problems linked to disharmony by the Central Committee implies that there is at least the perception of a strong correlation. For the CCP and neighboring states, social unrest must be viewed as a primary security concern for three reasons: it is creating greater political mobilization, it threatens to forge linkages with democracy movements, and demonstrations are proving more difficult to contain. These three factors have the potential to challenge the CCP’s total political control, thus potentially destabilizing a state with a huge military arsenal and a history of violent, internal conflict that cannot be downplayed or ignored. Protests are uniting a variety of actors throughout local communities. Pollution issues are indiscriminate. The effects, though not equally felt by each person within a community, impact rich and poor, farmers and businessmen, families and individuals alike. As local communities respond to pollution issues through united opposition, it is leaving Beijing with no easy target upon which to blame unrest, and no simple option for how to quell whole communities with a common grievance. Moreover, protests serve as a venue for the politically disaffected who are unhappy with the current state of governance, and may be open to considering alternative forms of political rule. Environmental experts like Elizabeth Economy note that protests afford an opportunity for the environmental movement to forge linkages with democracy advocates. She notes in her book, The River Runs Black, that several environmentalists argue that change is only possible through greater democratization and notes that the environmental and democracy movements united in Eastern Europe prior to the end of the Cold War. It is conceivable that in this way, environmentally-motivated protests might help to spread democracy and undermine CCP rule. A further key challenge is trying to contain protests once they begin. The steady introduction of new media like cell phones, email, and text messaging are preventing China’s authorities from silencing and hiding unrest. Moreover, the ability to send and receive information ensures that domestic and international observers will be made aware of unrest, making it far more difficult for local authorities to employ state-sanctioned force. The security ramifications of greater social unrest cannot be overlooked. Linkages between environmental and democracy advocates potentially challenge the Party’s monolithic control of power. In the past, similar challenges by Falun Gong and the Tiananmen protestors have been met by force and detainment. In an extreme situation, such as national water shortages, social unrest could generate widespread, coordinated action and political mobilization that would serve as a midwife to anti-CCP political challenges, create divisions within the Party over how to deal with the environment, or lead to a massive show of force. Any of these outcomes would mark an erosion or alteration to the CCP’s current power dynamic. And while many would treat political change in China, especially the implosion of the Party, as a welcome development, it must be noted that any slippage of the Party’s dominance would most likely be accompanied by a period of transitional violence. Though most violence would be directed toward dissident Chinese, a ripple effect would be felt in neighboring states through immigration, impediments to trade, and an increased military presence along the Chinese border. All of these situations would alter security assumptions in the region.

#### This causes the CCP to launch WMDs and kill billions to try to hold onto power

Renxin 05 Renxin, Journalist, 8-3-2K5 (San, “CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death,” Epoch Times, www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. The CCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupled with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The “speech,” free of all disguises, lets the public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the “speech.” The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in China beggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. But we have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP’s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives. As the CCP is known to be a clique with a closed system, it is extraordinary for it to reveal its top secret on its own. One might ask: what is the CCP’s purpose to make public its gambling plan on its deathbed? The answer is: the “speech” would have the effect of killing three birds with one stone. Its intentions are the following: Expressing the CCP’s resolve that it “not be buried by either heaven or earth” (direct quote from the “speech”). But then, isn’t the CCP opposed to the universe if it claims not to be buried by heaven and earth? Feeling the urgent need to harden its image as a soft egg in the face of the Nine Commentaries. Preparing publicity for its final battle with mankind by threatening war and trumpeting violence. So, strictly speaking, what the CCP has leaked out is more of an attempt to clutch at straws to save its life rather than to launch a trial balloon. Of course, the way the “speech” was presented had been carefully prepared. It did not have a usual opening or ending, and the audience, time, place, and background related to the “speech” were all kept unidentified. One may speculate or imagine as one may, but never verify. The aim was obviously to create a mysterious setting. In short, the “speech” came out as something one finds difficult to tell whether it is false or true.

#### And, Chinese pollution causes nuclear war with Russia

Nankivell 05 (Nathan, Senior Researcher @ Office of the Special Advisor Policy, Maritime Forces Pacific Headquarters, Canadian Department of National Defence, China's Pollution and the Threat to Domestic and Regional Stability, China Brief Vol: 5 Issue: 22, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx\_ttnews%5Btt\_news%5D=3904&tx\_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=195&no\_cache=1)

In addition to the concerns already mentioned, pollution, if linked to a specific issue like water shortage, could have important geopolitical ramifications. China’s northern plains, home to hundreds of millions, face acute water shortages. Growing demand, a decade of drought, inefficient delivery methods, and increasing water pollution have reduced per capita water holdings to critical levels. Although Beijing hopes to relieve some of the pressures via the North-South Water Diversion project, it requires tens of billions of dollars and its completion is, at best, still several years away and, at worst, impossible. Yet just to the north lies one of the most under-populated areas in Asia, the Russian Far East. While there is little agreement among scholars about whether resource shortages lead to greater cooperation or conflict, either scenario encompasses security considerations. Russian politicians already allege possible Chinese territorial designs on the region. They note Russia’s falling population in the Far East, currently estimated at some 6 to 7 million, and argue that the growing Chinese population along the border, more than 80 million, may soon take over. While these concerns smack of inflated nationalism and scare tactics, there could be some truth to them. The method by which China might annex the territory can only be speculated upon, but would surely result in full-scale war between two powerful, nuclear-equipped nations.

#### And, shale development key to Chinese energy security.

Downs 00 (Erica, China Fellow @ Brookings, CHINA’S ENERGY SECURITY ACTIVITIES, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph\_reports/MR1244/MR1244.ch3.pdf)

The Chinese government can also improve China’s energy security through development of the country’s natural gas industry. Greater use of natural gas in China has been hindered by the absence of a bureaucratic champion for gas, the remote location of China’s gas reserves, an inadequate pipeline infrastructure, lack of a well developed market, and insufficient funding. However, over the past few years, the Chinese government has expanded the role of natural gas in China’s energy structure, primarily as a result of concern over China’s growing dependency on oil imports and widespread environmental degradation caused by coal. Other reasons for the high priority placed on natural gas development include chronic energy shortages and imbalances, increasingly competitive prices for natural gas vis-à-vis coal, and greater competition among China’s stateowned oil companies for shares of the natural gas market—a result of industrial reform. Fertilizer and chemical plants currently consume most of China’s natural gas, but the government has targeted the urban industrial and residential sectors and the transportation sector for greater natural gas use. 74 The Chinese government has stepped up its efforts to develop domestic gas reserves. The participation of foreign oil companies in gas development projects is encouraged because of the technological and financial constraints faced by China’s oil companies and the government’s desire to bring reserves on line as quickly as possible. CNPC and Shell recently signed a letter of intent to develop the Changbei natural gas field at the border of northern China’s Shaanxi Province and the Inner Mongolia autonomous region. It is projected that after this US$3 billion project is completed in 2004, it will annually supply 105.9 tcf of gas to eastern China within 20 years. 75 The Chinese government has also approved a proposed natural gas pipeline from the Xinjiang autonomous region to Shanghai municipality. Construction is expected to begin in 2001 at an estimated cost of US$7.23 billion for the pipeline alone and an additional US$6 billion for gas exploration in Xinjiang. CNPC plans to be the dominant shareholder. Foreign participation in the project is welcome. However, according to a Chinese official, foreign investors will not be granted access to the project’s operations because of energy security concerns—possibly a fear of foreign control over China’s gas resources. 76

#### The impact is China-India energy wars.

Clement 12 (Nicholas, China and India Vie for Energy Security, May 25, http://www.2point6billion.com/news/2012/05/25/china-and-india-vie-for-energy-security-11177.html)

The competitive relationship between China and India has become a defining feature of the strategic environment across emerging Asia. While both nations are currently not in direct conflict, there are several areas of strategic interest which could potentially be clashing points in the future. Energy security is one such point; and while escalation between China and India is unlikely, it is important to note that the energy policies of each nation are largely based on geopolitical considerations. First, it is important to recognize that energy cooperation between China and India over the past decade has been increasing. In January 2006, for example, both nations signed a memorandum of cooperation in the field of oil and natural gas which encouraged collaboration between their enterprises, including joint exploration and development of hydrocarbon resources. Escalations in global energy prices and political uncertainties in the Middle East, however, have resulted in both countries looking for long-term arrangements. As China and India are increasingly forced to rely on the global oil market to meet their energy demands, they are more susceptible to supply disruptions and price fluctuations. In response, both countries have partly followed geopolitical energy policies, based on notions of traditional security. Ultimately, what we see is the arrival of military and political planning in trying to solve the issue of natural resource shortages. Energy security is of utmost strategic importance to China and India if they hope to continue to expand their economies. Rapid growth rates in both countries have grown in tandem with increased demand for energy. By 2020, it is estimated that China and India combined will account for roughly one-third of the world’s GDP and, as such, will require vast amounts of energy to fuel their economies. As such, the competition for energy resources such as oil and natural gas will only become fiercer. An important aspect of energy security is maritime control in the Asia-Pacific oceans. The sea lines of communication that run through Asia effectively act as the vital arteries for both countries. Maritime security is thus of major national interest for both China and India, and is directly linked to their energy security. Recent military modernization within China has been focused towards upgrading its naval capabilities, and ultimately moving towards creating a strong and powerful blue-water navy. India’s drive for maritime dominance has resulted in its naval budget increasing from US$1.3 billion in 2001 to US$3.5 billion in 2006, with plans to further increase naval spending 40 percent by 2014. China’s thirst for oil has doubled over the last decade, and is only predicted to rise. Similarly, India relies on the energy shipped through maritime regions to fund its own industrialization. India continues to state its maritime goals in pure geopolitical terms, even explicitly acknowledging in their 2004 Maritime Doctrine that “control of the choke points would be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality.” Thus it is clear that energy security has been directly translated into a national security issue, which has both political and military implications. The geopolitical rivalry in Myanmar between China and India provides great insight into their adversarial energy relationship. In Myanmar, both Chinese and Indian geopolitical and geoeconomic interests collide, and as such, may become a point of contention between China and India. Myanmar holds vast strategic importance for both China and India due to its location and abundance of natural resources. It has vast reserves of natural gas, so for both China and India it is presented as a source of energy free from the geopolitical risks of the Middle East. There has thus been major competition between China and India for access to the market. India has signed a US$40 billion deal with Myanmar for the transfer of natural gas, and has also had frequent discussions about building a pipeline from Myanmar to India. However, China has increasingly gained the most from Myanmar’s available resources. In 2005, for example, Myanmar reneged on a deal with India, and instead signed a 30-year contract with China for the sale of 6.5 trillion cubic liters of natural gas. For China, Myanmar is also important as it provides a land route to the Indian Ocean that vital resources could be shipped through in place of the Strait of Malacca. The potential for the Malacca Strait to be blockaded by a rival is of great concern to China, since as much as 85 percent of China’s oil is shipped through the region. For India, Myanmar is also of a strategic importance due to its location. China is already on friendly terms with Pakistan and has been expanding its presence in the Indian Ocean, thus giving India a feeling of Chinese encirclement. India’s interest in Myanmar directly relates to the growing presence and influence of China in the region. China’s “string of pearls” strategy refers to attempts to negotiate basing rights along the sea route linking the Middle East with China, including creating strong diplomatic ties with important states in the region. Not only does this contain India’s naval projection of power, it also directly threatens India’s energy access and the regional balance of power. While military confrontation between China and India remains unlikely, it is important to recognize that China and India’s energy policies revolve around traditional ideas of security, which highlight military and political balancing. Their energy policies are largely based on geopolitical and security considerations, and not just with regards to the global oil market. As such, it is critical for there to be ongoing diplomatic engagement between China and India to avoid unnecessary or accidental escalation.

#### Participating in oil joint ventures boosts US-China energy coop, allowing them to learn from us and control air pollution and environmental degradation.

Wu, Brookings Visiting Fellow, 08 (Richard Weixing Hu, Advancing Sino-U.S. Energy Cooperation Amid Oil Price Hikes, March, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2008/03/energy-hu)

Fourth, both governments should encourage their energy companies to collaborate in jointly enlarging the global oil supply, and should support the transfer of energy technologies transfer. It would be good for both countries to avoid negative global competition for oil, politically. Commercially, energy companies from both countries could form joint ventures in extracting oil and other forms of energy, so that they could enlarge energy supply for global markets as well as for domestic markets. Both governments should avoid providing cover for their energy companies to compete in third countries. Actually, they have a common enemy in dissuading resource nationalism and market monopoly in the world energy market. U.S. companies also have a big role to play in helping China’s development of energy efficiency and green-energy technology. Given the growing size of its economy, China’s energy efficiency and environmentally sustainable use of energy means a big reduction of pollutants into air and a considerable contribution to the common course of global environmental protection.

#### And, politicization of Chinese energy deals independently undermines US-China energy relations, which causes hostile Chinese naval modernization.

Lieberthal and Herberg 06 (Kenneth, Distinguished Fellow and Director for China at The William Davidson institute, and research associate of the China Center at the University of Michigan, and Mikkal, Director of the asian Energy security program at The national bureau of asian research, China’s Search for Energy Security: Implications for U.S. Policy\*, http://www.nbr.org/publications/nbranalysis/pdf/vol17no1.pdf)

Both the United States and China will benefit if they can develop a collaborative relationship on energy issues—as opposed to the current trajectory characterized by growing mistrust, suspicion, and competition. In reality, the fundamental global energy interests of China and the United states largely converge. China’s new energy security challenges mirror the United states’ own long-standing energy security challenges. Both countries share an interest in avoiding global supply disruptions, maintaining stability in the Persian Gulf, accelerating the development of new oil and gas resources, expanding the development and use of clean coal technologies, increasing global energy supply diversification, creating greater transit and fuel flexibility, expanding and improving emergency oil-sharing arrangements, and managing the environmental fallout from unrestrained fossil fuel consumption . What can the United States do to make constructive cooperation more likely? Is attaining such cooperation a feasible objective for U.S. policy? Thus far the U.S. response to China’s energy rise has been relatively ad hoc, reactive, and counterproductive. Compounded by China’s own lack of transparency, U.S. reactions have suffered from a poor understanding of China on many levels, including China’s energy dilemmas, the complex interests driving Beijing’s global energy approach, the goals and relationships that characterize Chinese energy institutions and state energy companies, and the linkages between energy and other issues in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). U.S. Congressional reaction to China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) 2005 bid for Unocal both revealed how little some U.S. policymakers understand about China’s global energy push and showed how divisive these issues have become for an already strained U .s .-China relationship . The failed bid also demonstrated that, in today’s atmosphere of high energy prices and fears over long-term energy scarcity, both the United states and China are focused intently on their national energy security and tend to assume the worst of the other’s intentions. Moreover, the energy policymaking institutions of both China and the United States make effective energy cooperation very difficult. Therefore, the central question hinges on whether the United States and China will be able to reduce their existing mistrust, which is exacerbated by broader strategic tensions, and devise prudent and serious ways to begin working together to achieve mutual interests in energy . In fact, energy cooperation could actually contribute to building the trust required for potentially broader international cooperation between China and the United States. The United States and China seem to hold fundamentally different views of global energy markets. This reality makes effective dialogue on energy issues both more difficult and more necessary. China’s energy strategy currently appears rooted in a statist, mercantilist mentality among political leaders in Beijing. The United States, on the other hand, has a stated policy of relying largely on global markets to deliver energy supply security. 4 The United States does not always fully appreciate how its own colossal weight in global energy and geopolitics affects China’s concerns regarding U.S. ability to threaten China’s energy interests. Ed Morse, an expert on energy and politics, sums up the problem by asserting that, “The U.S . is mostly ‘brawn’ and limited ‘brain’ .” 5 Suspicions remain high both in Beijing and Washington regarding the other’s intentions on key energy security and supply questions. Without a more sophisticated policy response in both Washington and Beijing, the risk is that energy issues are becoming not a source of constructive cooperation but rather a deepening source of competition, misperceptions, and excuses for obstructing one another’s interests. If Beijing believes that the United States is attempting to use energy politics as an instrument to weaken and contain China, then Beijing will be more likely to use its growing energy influence to frustrate U.S. foreign and security policies. The array of negative results from such a scenario might include increasing Chinese “hoarding” of oil and natural gas fields and supplies, tying Chinese energy investments abroad ever more closely to dubious regimes, promoting security cooperation with adversarial governments, and politicizing global energy markets. Such fallout would also increase the leverage of government hard-liners in Beijing who want to develop blue-water naval capabilities to challenge U.S. control of the SLOCs through which large shares of China’s future oil and natural gas supplies will flow. 6 A wide range of other negative outcomes could be imagined. It is therefore in the best interests of both countries to try to understand each other’s energy insecurities and find new ways to work toward cooperative outcomes.

#### Chinese naval modernization causes miscalculation, risking conflict with the US.

United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission 09 (“THE IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S NAVAL MODERNIZATION FOR THE UNITED STATES,” HEARING BEFORE THE U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION, June 11, http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/transcripts/09\_06\_11\_trans/09\_06\_11\_trans.pdf)

In this hearing, witnesses told the Commission that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is rapidly modernizing its naval forces and improving its naval capabilities. Furthermore, although the PLA Navy has been modernizing for at least two decades, the rate of modernization has increased in recent years. This naval modernization consists of two main components: a technical side and an institutional side. The technical side is primarily comprised of large-scale acquisitions of new, more advanced vessels, aircraft, weapons, and command and control systems. On the institutional side, the PLA Navy has sought to improve the quality of its personnel and its training in order to better utilize newly acquired naval platforms and weapons. Although nominally defensive, China’s strategy of naval modernization could affect how the United States and its allies deploy forces, protect bases and troops, and conduct military operations in East and Southeast Asia. In addition, as the PLA Navy continues to improve its capabilities, it will more frequently interact with other regional navies, including the U.S. Navy. As China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea demonstrates, a greater PLA Navy presence in the region could increase the potential for conflict between the United States and China over existing international maritime norms and practices. A key component of China’s naval modernization that the hearing’s expert witnesses pointed out was the technical modernization made in recent years. Since at least 2004, the PLA Navy has acquired numerous new vessels and aircraft, to include 21 submarines, eight destroyers, and 24 advanced fighters. Moreover, recent high-level remarks within the Chinese government indicate that Beijing is planning on building aircraft carriers. In addition, the PLA Navy has increased its arsenal of advanced weapons, particularly antiship cruise missiles, land attack cruise missiles, and advanced naval mines. Of particular importance for the United States is the PLA’s apparent desire to develop anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), which are intended to degrade the force-multiplying effect of U.S. aircraft carriers. Finally, tying these various platforms and weapons together are advances in the PLA’s C4ISR system (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance system). The PLA Navy has also begun modernizing and improving its capabilities to use these new acquisitions. Witnesses testified that the PLA Navy has taken several important steps towards improving the quality of its personnel. These steps include raising the standards for entry and promotion for both enlisted personnel and officers, as well as creating a non-commissioned officer corps—a key requirement for a modern military. Furthermore, the PLA Navy has sought to improve the quality of its training, for both individuals and units. These changes will help the PLA develop its naval capabilities, and help to shape the PLA Navy into a modern force. Taken together, these modernization efforts have several implications for the national security of the United States and its allies. First, the Commission’s witnesses testified that China’s naval modernization increasingly allows the PLA to deny the U.S. military access to China’s littoral waters and the Western Pacific. As the PLA Navy improves its capabilities, advanced Chinese naval platforms and weapons in the hands of well-trained, professional soldiers will increase the dangers confronting U.S. forward-deployed forces, possibly requiring them to operate at a distance in order to maintain safety. For example, witnesses stated that the PLA currently deploys several types of advanced anti-ship cruise missiles that form the backbone of China’s anti-access and sea denial strategy. 1 Furthermore, PLA anti-ship ballistic missiles could become a potential “game changer” in naval warfare should they become operational. 2 It was also pointed out that although the U.S. Navy has ample forces and capabilities to deal with the PLA Navy in the near and midterms, the outcome of a naval confrontation in the long term is less certain. 3 A second implication of China’s naval modernization is the direct relationship between greater capabilities and a more robust naval presence. As the PLA Navy improves its capabilities, it is likely that its vessels will more frequently be encountered by other navies in the region and around the globe. For example, a few years ago the PLA Navy would have been unlikely to execute its on-going anti-piracy deployment in the Gulf of Aden. In addition, in recent years there has been a dramatic increase in PLA Navy port calls both within and outside of the region. An increased PLA Navy presence in the region is not by itself negative. However it could be problematic when coupled with Beijing’s failure to conform to current international maritime norms and practices in regards to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). Of key importance here is the possibility for misinterpretation and inadvertent conflict arising from Beijing’s view of maritime law. According to one witness, some influential PLA scholars wrote that any military action, including freedom of navigation and overflight acts, in its EEZ could be “considered a use of force or a threat to use force”—a very liberal take on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 4 Such an interpretation by the PRC could lead to a serious incident at sea between the PLA Navy and the U.S. or other regional navies. Furthermore, some witnesses pointed out that if the PLA feels it is the stronger of the parties involved, it may be more inclined to resort to violence. A final implication of China’s naval modernization is its potential threat to U.S. allies in the region. Besides numerical superiority, the PLA Navy also enjoys a growing qualitative superiority versus most navies in East and Southeast Asia. While the Japanese Navy is possibly the only navy (besides the U.S. Navy) that is qualitatively better than the PLA Navy, Article 9 of Japan’s constitution prohibits it from developing the power projection capability that is necessary in modern naval warfare. Complicating this dynamic is Japan’s near total reliance on overseas oil imports which travel routes within increasingly easy reach of the PLA Navy. In the South China Sea’s region Beijing clearly possesses the superior navy, with the potential development of a Chinese aircraft carrier only widening the gap between the PLA Navy and regional navies. As a consequence, a naval arms race in East Asia may ensue.

#### The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is particularly high- focusing on improving relations is critical.

Glaser, CSIS Senior Fellow, 12 (Bonnie, Senior Fellow,Center for Strategic and International Studies, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region’s possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China’s two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China’s military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.

### Plan

#### Thus the plan:

#### The United States Federal Government should exclude crude oil and natural gas production from Exon-Florio reviews.

### Solvency-:45

#### Contention 4-Solvency:

#### Narrowing the definition of national security to exclude “energy assets” insulates the CFIUS process from protectionist manipulation.

Carroll-Emory International Law Review-9 23 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 167 COMMENT: BACK TO THE FUTURE: REDEFINING THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACT'S CONCEPTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Conclusion Exon-Florio should be amended to more narrowly define national security. The open-ended nature of the current definition has allowed the process to become politicized. Instead, national security should be specifically defined so as to prevent acquisition of industries that are critical to the military aspects of our national defense and that have capacities that are not duplicable by other market entities. The definition should also serve to ensure that export control laws are not circumvented by foreign acquisition of American companies. The following proposed definition would once again focus on preventing foreign governments from gaining unique military capabilities through private transactions that could threaten American national security: National Security shall be defined so as to consider the following factors in reviewing foreign acquisitions: A. Potential effect upon assets essential to the military aspects of national defense, specifically those firms whose contributions to the national defense cannot be easily replaced by another domestic corporation; B. Whether the acquisition poses a substantial risk of espionage or terrorism that can be certified by the relevant United States intelligence agencies; C. Whether the acquisition would pose a unique risk of weapons proliferation of critical military assets that cannot be otherwise dealt with by United States laws, particularly to countries that are not allies of the United States; [\*198] D. Economic security, or any other factor not mentioned in this section, shall not be considered by the CFIUS process. 222 Such an interpretation of national security would heavily scrutinize acquisition of, or joint ventures with, Lockheed Martin or any other company that makes a large contribution to the defense industrial base. Certain high-tech companies that produce computer chips that give the U.S. armed forces technological advantages over other countries might also fall under this definition. China should not be allowed to acquire a controlling interest in the present-day equivalent of Fairchild Semiconductor. This proposed definition of national security would be even more limited than the original Exon-Florio signed by President Reagan, as Exon-Florio was designed to apply mainly to defense-based technological acquisitions. 223 The main difference between this definition of national security and the original Exon-Florio legislation is that this definition would codify national security to explicitly prevent protectionist use of the CFIUS for political ends. Any consideration of economic security or protection of energy assets from foreign acquisition would be excluded from this definition, as inclusion of such economic factors can only encourage protectionism and politicization of the CFIUS process. 224 The narrower definition of national security would eliminate the mandatory reviews of every foreign-government-controlled transaction as required by FINSA. 225 Instead, the CFIUS would be given flexibility to decide which transactions truly threaten national security, without being bound to review every governmental acquisition. Narrowing the definition of national security in this manner would allow the CFIUS to focus its resources on real national security threats, rather than waste resources analyzing nearly every transaction involving a foreign governmental takeover. 226 The CFIUS should certainly consider the prospect of terrorism and take every step possible to safeguard against such a risk. In many cases, safeguards such as extra scans on containers should be put in place to minimize the risk of [\*199] terrorism. These safeguards should be applied regardless of whether the ownership is foreign or domestic. 227 Protectionism cannot replace the Department of Homeland Security when it comes to defending critical infrastructure. 228 Besides, the terrorists who struck on 9/11 did not own substantial property within the United States. Nor would the CFIUS regulations have stopped the subsequent terrorist incidents, such as Richard Reid's attempted shoe bomb or the anthrax shipments. In fact, there is no evidence that any company has been used as a front for a terrorist plot. 229 However, transactions should be blocked by the CFIUS on the basis of homeland security only when there is evidence of a clear and present threat of terrorism, or perhaps of espionage or sabotage. If the term "critical infrastructure" must be kept in FINSA, then members of Congress and the CFIUS must do a better job articulating what exactly constitutes critical infrastructure and what they consider the link between foreign ownership of critical infrastructure and threats to national security. 230 Explicitly laying out such guidelines will illustrate the boundaries to foreign investors and will make CFIUS decisions seem less arbitrary and political. 231 Additionally, screening employees of foreign corporations that purchase critical infrastructure can often identify potential security vulnerabilities without taking the drastic step of vetoing a transaction. 232 Limiting the Exon-Florio definition of national security only to military threats may seem odd and reactionary in the post-9/11 world, where unconventional threats abound. However, counter-terrorism requires appropriate tools, and regulating foreign direct investment simply falls short of being a cost-effective method of ensuring homeland security. 233 Focusing on the nationality of a company's ownership in a globalized world only distracts us from real security threats posed by non-state actors. 234 Many terrorist threats do not exist as a result of primary support from any nation, but rather as tactics in service of an ideology. 235 As Jose Padilla, John Walker Lindh, and [\*200] many others have illustrated, no one ethnic group has a monopoly on Al-Qaeda membership or support. Instead of penalizing investments from various Arab states simply because terrorists draw support from that region, homeland security policy should focus on thwarting the terrorists themselves. The CFIUS must return to a focus on state military capabilities because the terrorist threats are from non-state actors, and restricting economic investment from certain nations does not, per se, deal with the threat of terrorism. Just because terrorism is a serious threat does not mean that the CFIUS is the best tool to protect critical infrastructure. In conclusion, 9/11 did radically change the world, and Exon-Florio should change to fit the new realities of homeland security. However, the most effective reform of Exon-Florio is not expansion of the definition of national security to include economic protectionism, but rather a narrowing of the definition to guard against real threats to American security while encouraging beneficial foreign investment. The security challenges of the twenty-first century cannot be met by protectionism. Only by embracing globalization and cooperation can the United States truly achieve national security.

#### And, oil and gas are the key energy issues for CFIUS.

Ellis-Vinson & Elkins LLP-6/1/07

US energy and foreign direct investment: Is the foreign capital flow for oil and gas at risk?

<http://www.ogfj.com/articles/print/volume-4/issue-6/capital-perspectives/us-energy-and-foreign-direct-investment-is-the-foreign-capital-flow-for-oil-and-gas-at-risk.html>

Energy has traditionally been an area of some concern for CFIUS. In fact, one early controversial transaction reviewed by CFIUS was the 1981 acquisition of Santa Fe International Corp., a major drilling, exploration, and services company, by Kuwait Petroleum. Santa Fe owned some sensitive technology that had nuclear defense applications. At the time, CFIUS did not yet have any enforcement authority, so the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department was asked to hold up the merger. Ultimately, the transaction was allowed to go forward after Santa Fe agreed to sell off its sensitive technology so that it would not be transferred to Kuwait Petroleum. While it is not difficult to see how nuclear technology and nuclear energy deals would be subject to CFIUS scrutiny, the relationship between oil and gas and national security is more tenuous. On Sept. 11, 2001, the nation’s concept of “national security” was changed forever. In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the government’s focus switched from its traditional examination of military targets and military assets, to a new emphasis on “critical infrastructure.” In order to facilitate protection of critical infrastructure, the President issued a directive in 2003 requiring, among other things, oversight by the Department of Energy of critical infrastructure related to “energy, including the production refining, storage, and distribution of oil and gas.” Additionally, since 9/11, CFIUS has been subject to increasing pressure by Congress to review foreign acquisitions of “critical infrastructure” for national security concerns. Since 9/11, the number of CFIUS filings per year has doubled, with significant growth projected for 2007 (See Figure 1). Nearly 20% of CFIUS filings in 2006 were energy-related - a trend that has continued thus far in 2007

#### And, the US should clarify that energy production does not undermine national security-- explicitly exempting specific industries from CFIUS review is key.

Pane 05 (Marc, studied ILaw at Fordham, worked for the Office of the Principal Defender for the Special Court for Sierra Leone, CNOOC’s Bid for UNOCAL: Now is the Time to Improve theExon-Florio Amendment, http://www.scribd.com/doc/61823408/CNOOC-s-Bid-for-UNOCAL-Now-is-the-Time-to-Improve-the-Exon-Florio-Amendment)

What does this all mean for Exon-Florio? Almost since its enactment, numerous critics have raised the need, in one way or another, to narrow the scope of CFIUS review and to make it more transparent and accessible to concerned parties. 152 One student of Exon-Florio recently suggested that CFIUS define “national security” by explicitly specifying, among other things, exempt industries and protected technologies. 153 Sixteen years earlier, another had argued that “more detailed criteria in the regulations on the meaning of ‘national security’ and sample hypotheticals illustrative of ‘threats’ to national security, could help guide investors.”154 Confusion about the definition of national security is not limited to parties outside the black-box of CFIUS. A Government Accounting Office (GAO) report released in September of 2005 indicates that there is disagreement within CFIUS itself. 155 The Department of the Treasury takes a “narrow” definition, considering “a U.S. company’s possession of export controlled technologies or items, classified contracts, and critical technology; or specific derogatory intelligence on the foreign company.” 156 The Departments of Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security, on the other hand, take a broader view, examining such factors as the effects of foreign control on “critical infrastructure” and a decrease in the number of domestic businesses engaged in defense-critical industries. 157 The report suggests that the possible negative impact of Exon-Florio review on trade policy is a greater factor in Treasury considerations than it is for the other mentioned departments. 158 In its conclusions, the report states that “In light of the differing views within [CFIUS] regarding the extent of authority provided by Exon-Florio, the Congress should consider amending Exon-Florio by more clearly emphasizing the factors that should be considered in determining potential harm to national security.” 159 Possibly recognizing that it is a function of Congress, not the GAO, to make any amendments, the report does not comment on the form they should take. 160 CNOOC-Unocal might offer some guidance. The traditional view of national security as dependant on domestic control of technologies and resources alone seems increasingly anachronistic. Exon-Florio should be updated to reflect a world where security threats may arise from a failure to properly integrate national interests with the global economy. To that end, any definition of national security should incorporate a definition of “energy security,” and do so in a form that clearly indicates what degree of national control over production, distribution, and physical energy reserves is necessary or desirable (taking into account that any policy which seeks to isolate the United States and other global players from global energy markets might result in a greater risk of supply disruption).

## \*\*\*2ac

### 2AC Pan

#### ---Affirmative is a prerequisite to resolve Chinese security dilemmas.

#### (A.) CFIUS review requires determinist securitization of energy assets --- That’s Carroll --- The plan halts the material expansion of securitization into foreign investment and energy policy.

#### (B.) Mean’s their self fulfilling prophecy/serial policy failure impacts are descriptive of the status quo, not the affirmative.

Pan 2007

Chengxin, School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, What Is Chinese About Chinese Business? Implications for U.S. Responses to China’s Rise, Asia Research Centre, CBS, Copenhagen Discussion Papers

From the global production network perspective, not only does the assumption of a zero-sum game between China and the United States become problematic, but the notion of the so-called ‘Chinese business practices’ becomes problematic, as what is often termed as ‘Chinese business practices’ may be seen as a product of the interactions between Chinese and transnational companies, including U.S. companies. For instance, the Unocal bids by CNOOC, a state-owned company in China, has been seen as a proof of China’s sinister business strategy to undermine U.S. national security. Yet, what is less well-known is that Goldman Sachs, whose CEO Henry Paulson is currently U.S. Treasury Secretary, was involved in financing the aborted CNOOC-Unocal deal (Hawkins 2006). In this sense, Chinese companies’ acquisitions of natural resources in various parts of the world, while drawing much alarm and criticism in the U.S. and elsewhere, are nothing uniquely Chinese. As Michael Klare explains, the United States, Britain, France, Japan, and other Western oil-importing countries have long competed among themselves for drilling rights in overseas producing areas…. China may be a newcomer to this contest, but is not behaving noticeably differently from the other oil-seekers. Indeed, the “National Energy Policy” announced by President George W. Bush on May 17, 2001, calls for US officials to conduct the same sort of diplomatic quest in pursuit of foreign energy as that now being undertaken by Chinese officials (Klare 2006:182). Understood this way, threatening to retaliate against ‘China’ is not only unlikely to eliminate those ‘Chinese’ business practices, but it could in fact provide further impetus to them. It is in this sense that I consider the policies based on a unitary Chinese economic Other counterproductive and potentially dangerous. Again take the American nationalistic responses to CNOOC’s Unocal for example. By effectively declaring to the Chinese that North America is off limits, American policy-makers sent ‘precisely the wrong message to China’s modernizing managerial class and encourage highly damaging … tendencies in China, including nationalism, mercantilism and distrust of the international markets’ Harding et al 2006:64). Similarly, Hadar notes that ‘by taking steps to derail the Unocal-CNOOC deal, Washington is helping set in motion what could be only described as a self-fulfilling prophecy’ (2005). Since no amount of U.S. legislation would be able to reduce the global production demand for energy in China, China would seem to ‘have no choice in light of the US policies but to form special economic or foreign policy relationships’ with the so-called ‘rogue states’ (Hadar 2005). Of course, this in turn could confirm the suspicion of China many Americans have long held, thereby giving rise to a vicious cycle of mutual suspicion and hostility. Starting out with the image of a homogeneous Chinese Other and consistently acting upon it, hawkish policy-makers in Washington could well succeed in bringing out a more unified rival in China down the road.

### 2AC Trade

#### Nobel prize winning studies confirm the possibility of economic prediction in the face of uncertainty and essentialist models.

Caldwell 2004

Bruce, Ph.D., Hayek’s Challenge: an Intellectual Biography of F.A. Hayek University of Chicago Press p. 330

Experimental economists like **Vernon Smith**, the other **Nobel Prize winner** in 2002, who focus on market experiments rather than on individual choice, have reached equally startling results: "In many experimental markets, poorly informed, error prone, and uncomprehending [FOUND] human agents interact through the trading rules to produce social algorithms which demonstrably **approximate the wealth maximizing outcomes traditionally thought to require complete information and cognitively rational actors**" (Smith 1994,118). When taken together, these diverse arguments seem to me to lend support to Robbins's contention that economic reasoning **does not depend** on real agents having **perfect foresight** or being able to exhibit **perfect rationality**. They support his idea that these assumptions are expository devices used in simple models, not fundamental assumptions. Their usage allows the models to capture the results of certain constraints that operate in a world of scarcity and that allow (typically market-level) predictions to be made.9

#### (C.) Winning an epistemological challenge doesn’t disprove the affirmative --- Disproving the possibility of epistemic certainty also disproves the possibility of total epistemic uncertainty meaning even winning 100% of their argument only functions as partial case defense.

Cowen 2004

Tyler, Department of Economics @ George Mason University, The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute Consequentialism, http://www.gmu.edu/centers/publicchoice/faculty%20pages/Tyler/Epistemic2.pdf

The epistemic critique relies heavily on a complete lack of information about initial circumstances. This is not a plausible general assumption, although it may sometimes be true. The critique may give the impression of relying more heavily on a more plausible assumption, namely a high variance for the probability distribution of our estimates concerning the future. But simply increasing the level of variance or uncertainty does not add much force to the epistemic argument. To see this more clearly, consider another case of a high upfront benefit. Assume that the United States has been hit with a bioterror attack and one million children have contracted smallpox. We also have two new experimental remedies, both of which offer some chance of curing smallpox and restoring the children to perfect health. If we know for sure which remedy works, obviously we should apply that remedy. But imagine now that we are uncertain as to which remedy works. The uncertainty is so extreme that each remedy may cure somewhere between three hundred thousand and six hundred thousand children. Nonetheless we have a slight idea that one remedy is better than the other. That is, one remedy is slightly more likely to cure more children, with no other apparent offsetting negative effects or considerations. Despite the greater uncertainty, we still have the intuition that we should try to save as many children as possible. We should apply the remedy that is more likely to cure more children. We do not say: “We are now so uncertain about what will happen. We should pursue some goal other than trying to cure as many children as possible.” Nor would we cite greater uncertainty about longer-run events as an argument against curing the children. We have a definite good in the present (more cured children), balanced against a radical remixing of the future on both sides of the equation. The definite upfront good still stands firm. Alternatively, let us assume that our broader future suddenly became less predictable (perhaps genetic engineering is invented, which creates new and difficult-to-forecast possibilities). That still would not diminish the force of our reason for saving more children. The variance of forecast becomes larger on both sides of the equation – whether we save the children or not – and the value of the upfront lives remains. A higher variance of forecast might increase the required size of the upfront benefit (to overcome the Principle of Roughness), but it would not refute the relevance of consequences more generally.

### 2AC A2: Speed Econ K

#### Recessions and economic collapse consolidate the worst forms of predatory capitalism. Means “their” impacts are really “our” impacts.

Mead 2009

Walter Russell, Senior Fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=571cbbb9-2887-4d81-8542-92e83915f5f8&p=2

And yet, this relentless series of crises has not disrupted the rise of a global capitalist system, centered first on the power of the United Kingdom and then, since World War II, on the power of the United States. After more than 300 years, it seems reasonable to conclude that financial and economic crises do not, by themselves, threaten either the international capitalist system or the special role within it of leading capitalist powers like the United Kingdom and the United States. If anything, the opposite seems true--that financial crises in some way sustain Anglophone power and capitalist development. Indeed, many critics of both capitalism and the "Anglo-Saxons" who practice it so aggressively have pointed to what seems to be a perverse relationship between such crises and the consolidation of the "core" capitalist economies against the impoverished periphery. Marx noted that financial crises remorselessly crushed weaker companies, allowing the most successful and ruthless capitalists to cement their domination of the system. For dependency theorists like Raul Prebisch, crises served a similar function in the international system, helping stronger countries marginalize and impoverish developing ones.

#### Tech solves the impact

De Mesquita 2009

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a professor of political science at New York University, Recipe for Failure, Foreign Policy, November/December 2009, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/16/recipe\_for\_failure?page=full

So how might we solve global warming and make the world in 500 years look attractive to our future selves? My short answer: New technologies will solve the problem for us. There is an equilibrium at which enough global warming -- a very modest amount more than we may already have, probably enough to be here in 50 to 100 years -- will create enough additional sunshine in cold places, enough additional rain in dry places, enough additional wind in still places, and, most importantly, enough additional incentives for humankind that solar panels, hydroelectricity, windmills, and as yet undiscovered technologies will be good and cheap enough to replace fossil fuels. We have already warmed enough for there to be all kinds of interesting research going on, but today such pursuits take more sacrifice than most people seem willing to make. Tomorrow that might not be true, and at that point, I doubt it'll be too late. And, looking out 500 years, we'll probably have figured out how to beam ourselves to distant planets where we can start all over, warming our solar system, our galaxy, and beyond with abandon.

#### Capitalism is sustainable --- Empirically resilent in the face of criticism & short term failure.

Meltzer 2009

Allan, Professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon University’s School of Business, Visiting Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, First Recipient of the AEI Irving Kristol Award, and Chairman of the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, March 12, “Why Capitalism?” 2008-2009 Bradley Lecture Series, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.29525,filter.all/pub\_detail.asp

Newspaper headlines during the peak of the housing-credit crisis called it "the end of capitalism" or the end of American capitalism. As often, they greatly overstated and misstated by projecting a serious, temporary decline as a permanent loss of wealth. Capitalist systems have weathered many more serious problems. Capitalism as a guiding system for economic activity has spread over the centuries to now encompass most of the world's economies. This spread occurred despite almost continuous hostility from many intellectuals and, in recent decades, military threat from avowedly Communist countries. Capitalist systems are neither rigid nor identical. They differ, change, and adapt. Their common feature is that the means of production are mainly owned by individuals; economic activity takes place in markets, and individuals are free to choose to greater or lesser degree what they do, where they work, and how they allocate their income and wealth. Capitalism is an institutional arrangement for producing goods and services. The success of this arrangement requires a legal foundation based on the rule of law that protects rights to property and in the first instance aligns rewards to values produced. It provides incentives to participants to act in ways that produce desired outcomes. Like any system, it has successes and failures. It is the only system that increases both growth and freedom.

### 2AC Off

#### The judge is a policymaker evaluating federal government action – that’s key to predictability because our interpretation is contingent on the resolution and it also checks multiple negative critical frameworks.

#### ---Disengagement from traditional politics solidifies the conservative stranglehold over policymaking --- Only our hypothesizing about the complex inner-working of government is can create space for the critique.

McClean 2001

David E., “The Cultural Left and the Limits of Social Hope,” Am. Phil. Conf., www.american-philosophy.org/archives/past\_conference\_programs/pc2001/Discussion%20papers/david\_mcclean.htm

Yet for some reason, at least partially explicated in Richard Rorty's Achieving Our Country, a book that I think is long overdue, leftist critics continue to cite and refer to the eccentric and often a priori ruminations of people like those just mentioned, and a litany of others including Derrida, Deleuze, Lyotard, Jameson, and Lacan, who are to me hugely more irrelevant than Habermas in their narrative attempts to suggest policy prescriptions (when they actually do suggest them) aimed at curing the ills of homelessness, poverty, market greed, national belligerence and racism. I would like to suggest that it is time for American social critics who are enamored with this group, those who actually want to be relevant, to recognize that they have a disease, and a disease regarding which I myself must remember to stay faithful to my own twelve step program of recovery. The disease is the need for elaborate theoretical "remedies" wrapped in neological and multi-syllabic jargon. These elaborate theoretical remedies are more "interesting," to be sure, than the pragmatically settled questions about what shape democracy should take in various contexts, or whether private property should be protected by the state, or regarding our basic human nature (described, if not defined (heaven forbid!), in such statements as "We don't like to starve" and "We like to speak our minds without fear of death" and "We like to keep our children safe from poverty"). As Rorty puts it, "When one of today's academic leftists says that some topic has been 'inadequately theorized,' you can be pretty certain that he or she is going to drag in either philosophy of language, or Lacanian psychoanalysis, or some neo-Marxist version of economic determinism. . . . These futile attempts to philosophize one's way into political relevance are a symptom of what happens when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a spectatorial approach to the problems of its country. Disengagement from practice produces *theoretical hallucinations*"(italics mine).(1) Or as John Dewey put it in his The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy, "I believe that philosophy in America will be lost between chewing a historical cud long since reduced to woody fiber, or an apologetics for lost causes, . . . . or a scholastic, schematic formalism, unless it can somehow bring to consciousness America's own needs and its own implicit principle of successful action." Those who suffer or have suffered from this disease Rorty refers to as the Cultural Left, which left is juxtaposed to the Political Left that Rorty prefers and prefers for good reason. Another attribute of the Cultural Left is that its members fancy themselves pure culture critics who view the successes of America and the West, rather than some of the barbarous methods for achieving those successes, as mostly evil, and who view anything like national pride as equally evil even when that pride is tempered with the knowledge and admission of the nation's shortcomings. In other words, the Cultural Left, in this country, too often dismiss American society as beyond reform and redemption. And Rorty correctly argues that this is a disastrous conclusion, i.e. disastrous for the Cultural Left. I think it may also be disastrous for our social hopes, as I will explain. Leftist American culture critics might put their considerable talents to better use if they bury some of their cynicism about America's social and political prospects and help forge public and political possibilities in a spirit of determination to, indeed, achieve our country - the country of Jefferson and King; the country of John Dewey and Malcom X; the country of Franklin Roosevelt and Bayard Rustin, and of the later George Wallace and the later Barry Goldwater. To invoke the words of King, and with reference to the American society, the time is always ripe to seize the opportunity to help create the "beloved community," one woven with the thread of agape into a conceptually single yet diverse tapestry that shoots for nothing less than a true intra-American cosmopolitan ethos, one wherein both same sex unions and faith-based initiatives will be able to be part of the same social reality, one wherein business interests and the university are not seen as belonging to two separate galaxies but as part of the same answer to the threat of social and ethical nihilism. We who fancy ourselves philosophers would do well to create from within ourselves and from within our ranks a new kind of public intellectual who has both a hungry theoretical mind and who is yet capable of seeing the need to move past high theory to other important questions that are less bedazzling and "interesting" but more important to the prospect of our flourishing - questions such as "How is it possible to develop a citizenry that cherishes a certain hexis, one which prizes the character of the Samaritan on the road to Jericho almost more than any other?" or "How can we square the political dogma that undergirds the fantasy of a missile defense system with the need to treat America as but one member in a community of nations under a "law of peoples?" The new public philosopher might seek to understand labor law and military and trade theory and doctrine as much as theories of surplus value; the logic of international markets and trade agreements as much as critiques of commodification, and the politics of complexity as much as the politics of power (all of which can still be done from our arm chairs.) This means going down deep into the guts of our quotidian social institutions, into the grimy pragmatic details where intellectuals are loathe to dwell but where the officers and bureaucrats of those institutions take difficult and often unpleasant, imperfect decisions that affect other peoples' lives, and it means making honest attempts to truly understand how those institutions actually function in the actual world before howling for their overthrow commences. This might help keep us from being slapped down in debates by true policy pros who actually know what they are talking about but who lack awareness of the dogmatic assumptions from which they proceed, and who have not yet found a good reason to listen to jargon-riddled lectures from philosophers and culture critics with their snobish disrespect for the so-called "managerial class."

#### ---The affirmative is a prerequisite to the critique.

#### (A.) CFIUS review precludes meditation --- The process requires defining energy investment within the determinist frame of security and is the definition of problem/solution thinking.

#### (B.) The alternative fractures the left --- Meditative inaction unites the alternative with right wing china bashers and fractures opposition to the Pentagon’s militarist china policy.

Bello & Mittal 2000

Walden, Anuradha, Dangerous Liaisons: Progressives, the Right, and the Anti-China Trade Campaign, Institute for Food and Development Policy/Food First, May, http://www.tni.org/archives/archives\_bello\_china

A coalition of forces seeks to deprive China of permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) as a means of obstructing that country's entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO). We do not approve of the free-trade paradigm that underpins NTR status. We do not support the WTO; we believe, in fact, that it would be a mistake for China to join it. But the real issue in the China debate is not the desirability or undesirability of free trade and the WTO. The real issue is whether the United States has the right to serve as the gatekeeper to international organizations such as the WTO. More broadly, it is whether the United States government can arrogate to itself the right to determine who is and who is not a legitimate member of the international community. The issue is unilateralism-the destabilizing thrust that is Washington's oldest approach to the rest of the world. The unilateralist anti-China trade campaign enmeshes many progressive groups in the US in an unholy alliance with the right wing that, among other things, advances the Pentagon's grand strategy to contain China. It splits a progressive movement that was in the process of coming together in its most solid alliance in years. It is, to borrow Omar Bradley's characterization of the Korean War, "the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time".

#### ---Permutation Do Both --- Engage in meditative thought and <Aff>.

#### ---This is best.

#### (A. ) It’s try or die --- Even if they win a long term inevitability claim, the alternative has zero mechanism for resolving our <> advantage(s) which happen <timeframe>. The permutation is the only option that allows people to survive long enough to implement the alternative.

#### (B.) Only the permutation solves --- Technology is inevitable and employing it in conjunction with meditative thought preserves our relation to being while making life better. \*Star this card\* as it assumes their turns.

Heidegger 1955

Martin, Discourse on Thinking, Martin Heidegger: Philosophical and Political Writings pg 94

Let us give it a trial. For all of us, the arrangements, devices, and machinery of technology are to a greater or lesser extent indispensable. It would be foolish to attack technology blindly. It would be shortsighted to condemn it as the work of the devil. We depend on technical devices; they even challenge us to ever greater advances. But suddenly and unaware we find ourselves so firmly shackled to these technical devices that we fall into bondage to them. Still we can act otherwise. We can use technical devices, and yet with proper use also keep ourselves so free of them, that we may let go of them at any time. We can use technical devices as they ought to be used, and also let them alone as something which does not affect our inner and real core. We can affirm the unavoidable use of technical devices, and also deny them the right to dominate us, and so to warp, confuse, and lay waste our nature. But will not saying both yes and no this way to technical devices make our relation to technology ambivalent and insecure? On the contrary! Our relation to technology will become wonderfully simple and relaxed. We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses “yes” and at the same time “no,” by an old word, *releasement toward things*.

#### ---Problem/Solution framing is empirically successful --- Cold war arms control efforts prove you don’t need to reject Cartesian dualisms for successful policy implementation.

Hayward 2006

Steven F., previously the F.K. Weyerhaeuser Fellow at AEI, The Fate of the Earth in the Balance, SOCIETY AND CULTURE, http://www.aei.org/outlook/society-and-culture/the-fate-of-the-earth-in-the-balance/

Is Gore’s high-level metaphysical analysis necessary in the first place? Do we really have to resolve or unwind the problem of Platonic idealism and Cartesian dualism to address the problem of climate change? The example of the previous case in point--the arms race--suggests an answer. The arms race did not require a revolution in human consciousness or a transformation of national and global political institutions to bring about rapid and favorable changes. The kind of grandiose, pretentious thinking exemplified in Fate of the Earth played little or no role in these shifts. The problem turned out to be much simpler. The acute problem of the superpower arms race was mostly a moral problem--not a metaphysical problem--arising from the character of the irreconcilable regimes. As was frequently pointed out, the United States never worried about British or French nuclear weapons. Once the United States and the Soviet Union were able to establish a level of trust and common interest, unwinding the arms race became a relatively easy matter. Nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear proliferation in unsavory regimes (Iran, North Korea) is still around today, but the acute existential threat of the arms race has receded substantially. In the early 1980s, The Fate of the Earth became the Bible for the nuclear freeze movement--the simplistic idea brought to you by the same people who thought Ronald Reagan was a simpleton. To his credit, then representative and later senator Gore opposed the nuclear freeze. Nowadays Gore has started to call for an immediate freeze on greenhouse-gas emissions, which he must know is unrealistic. His explanation in a recent speech shows that he missed entirely the lesson from that earlier episode: An immediate freeze [on CO2 emissions] has the virtue of being clear, simple, and easy to understand. It can attract support across partisan lines as a logical starting point for the more difficult work that lies ahead. I remember a quarter century ago when I was the author of a complex nuclear arms control plan to deal with the then rampant arms race between our country and the former Soviet Union. At the time, I was strongly opposed to the nuclear freeze movement, which I saw as simplistic and naive. But, three-quarters of the American people supported it--and as I look back on those years I see more clearly now that the outpouring of public support for that very simple and clear mandate changed the political landscape and made it possible for more detailed and sophisticated proposals to eventually be adopted.[38] The irony of this statement is that since the moral and political differences between the United States and the Soviet Union could not be resolved diplomatically, the way to move relations forward was to convert relations into a technical problem (i.e., negotiations over the number and specifications of weapons systems). Gore remained firmly within the technocratic arms-control community throughout this period, even as Schell and others tried to moralize the arms-control problem with the nuclear freeze proposal. But the moral confusion (some critics said the premise of moral equivalence) of the freeze idea made it a sideshow at best and a hindrance at worst. On the contrary, President Reagan’s resistance to the freeze, as well as the conventions of the arms-control process to which Gore held, were crucial to his strategy for changing the dynamic of the arms race. Having been an arms-control technocrat in the 1980s, Gore today wants to turn the primarily technical and economic problems of climate change into a moral problem. Gore’s argument that climate change is a moral problem and not a political problem is not serious, since the leading prescriptions for treating the problem all require massive applications of political power on a global scale. Skeptics and cynics might dismiss Gore’s metaphysical speculations as mere intellectual preening, as many critics did with Fate of the Earth in the 1980s. But such an approach to environmental issues may be an obstacle to many practical, incremental steps that can be taken to solve real climate-policy problems. Once one grasps the Heideggerian character of the Gore approach to thinking about environmental problems, the hesitance about nuclear power comes into better focus. Gore and others in his mold dislike large-scale technologies because they are intrinsic to mankind’s mastery of nature that is driving our supposed alienation from nature. This same premise also explains the frequently hostile reaction of many environmentalists to suggestions that adaptation to climate change should be a part of any serious climate policy, even though many leading climate scientists and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change have embraced adaptation. The suggestion that technologies for climate modification might be developed, which would be the climate policy equivalent of Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, are greeted contemptuously for the same reason.

#### ---Their value to life claims are self-fulfilling --- Being is always already at hand; only the alternative’s neurotic concern for the power of technology distracts us from this fact, makes loss of being possible.

Latour 1993

Bruno, We Have Never Been modern, transl. Catherine Porter, pg 66-67

Who has forgotten Being? No one, no one ever has, otherwise Nature would be truly available as a pure `stock'. Look around you: scientific objects are circulating simultaneously as subjects objects and discourse. Networks are full of Being. As for machines, they are laden with subjects and collectives. How could a being lose its difference, its incompleteness, its mark, its trace of Being? This is never in anyone's power; otherwise we should have to imagine that we have truly been modern, we should be taken in by the upper half of the modern Constitution. Has someone, however, actually forgotten Being? Yes: anyone who really thinks that Being has really been forgotten. As Levi-Strauss says, ,the barbarian is first and foremost the man who believes in barbarism.' (Levi-Strauss, [1952] 1987, p. 12). Those who have failed to undertake empirical studies of sciences, technologies, law, politics, economics, religion or fiction have lost the traces of Being that are distributed everywhere among beings. If, scorning empiricism, you opt out of the exact sciences, then the human sciences, then traditional philosophy, then the sciences of language, and you hunker down in your forest - then you will indeed feel a tragic loss. But what is missing is you yourself, not the world! Heidegger's epigones have converted that glaring weakness into a strength. `We don't know anything empirical, but that doesn't matter, since your world is empty of Being. We are keeping the little flame of Being safe from everything, and you, who have all the rest, have nothing.' On the contrary: we have everything, since we have Being, and beings, and we have never lost track of the difference between Being and beings. We are carrying out the impossible project undertaken by Heidegger, who believed what the modern Constitution said about itself without understanding that what is at issue there is only half of a larger mechanism which has never abandoned the old anthropological matrix. No one can forget Being, since there has never been a modern world, or, by the same token,, metaphysics. We have always remained pre-Socratic,, pre-Cartesian, pre-Kantian, pre-Nietzschean. No radical revolution can separate us from these pasts, so there is no need for reactionary counter¬revolutions to lead us back to what has never been abandoned. Yes, Heraclitus is a surer guide than Heidegger: `Sinai gar kai entautha theous.'

#### ---The alternative ends in atrocity --- Calls to ‘let being be’ displace personal responsibility and are ultimately unable to differentiate between gas chambers and toaster ovens.

Bookchin 1995

Murray, Founder of the Institute for Social Ecology and Former Professor @ Ramapo College, Re Re-Enchanting Humanity: A Defense of the Human Spirit Against Antihumanism, Misanthropy, Mysticism and Primitivism, pg. 168-170

Heidegger's views on technology are part of a larger weltanschauung which is too multicolored to discuss here, and demands a degree of inter¬pretive effort we must forgo for the present in the context of a criticism of technophobia. Suffice it to say that there is a good deal of primitivistic animism in Heidegger's treatment of the 'revealing' that occurs when techne is a 'clearing' for the 'expression' of a crafted material - not unlike the Eskimo sculptor who believes (quite wrongly, I may add) that he is 'bringing out' a hidden form that lies in the walrus ivory he is carving. But this issue must be seen more as a matter of metaphysics than of a spir¬itually charged technique. Thus, when Heidegger praises a windmill, in contrast to the 'challenge' to a tract of land from which the ‘hauling out of coal and ore' is subjected, he is not being 'ecological'. Heidegger is concerned with a windmill, not as an ecological technology, but more metaphysically with the notion that 'its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing'. The windmill 'does not unlock energy from the air currents, in order to store it'.31 Like man in relation to Being, it is a medium for the 'realization' of wind, not an artifact for acquiring power. Basically, this interpretation of a technological interrelationship reflects a regression - socially and psychologically as well as metaphysically – into quietism. Heidegger advances a message of passivity or passivity conceived as a human activity, an endeavor to let things be and 'disclose' themselves. 'Letting things be' would be little more than a trite Maoist and Buddhist precept were it not that Heidegger as a National Socialist became all too ideologically engaged, rather than 'letting things be', when he was busily undoing 'intellectualism,' democracy, and techno-logical intervention into the 'world'. Considering the time, the place, and the abstract way in which Heidegger treated humanity's 'Fall' into technological ‘inauthenticity’ – a ‘Fall’ that he, like Ellul, regarded as inevitable, albeit a metaphysical, nightmare - it is not hard to see why he could trivialize the Holocaust, when he deigned to notice it at all, as part of a techno-industrial ‘condition’. 'Agriculture is now a motorized (motorsierte) food industry, in essence the same as the manufacturing of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps,' he coldly observed, 'the same as the blockade and starvation of the countryside, the same as the production of the hydrogen bombs.’32 In placing the industrial means by which many Jews were killed before the ideological ends that guided their Nazi exterminators, Heidegger essentially displaces the barbarism of a specific state apparatus, of which he was a part, by the technical proficiency he can attribute to the world at large! These immensely revealing offhanded remarks, drawn from a speech he gave in Bremen m 1949, are beneath contempt. But they point to a way of thinking that gave an autonomy to technique that has fearful moral consequences which we are living with these days in the name of the sacred, a phraseology that Heidegger would find very congenial were he alive today. Indeed, technophobia, followed to its logical and crudely primitivistic conclusions, finally devolves into a dark reactionism – and a paralyzing quietism. For if our confrontation with civilization turns on passivity before a ‘disclosing of Being’, a mere ‘dwelling’ on the earth, and a ‘letting things be’, to use Heidegger’s verbiage – much of which has slipped into deep ecology’s vocabulary as well – the choice between supporting barbarism and enlightened humanism has no ethical foundations to sustain it. Freed of values grounded in objectivity, we are lost in a quasi-religious antihumanism, a spirituality that can with the same equanimity hear the cry of a bird and ignore the anguish of six million once-living people who were put to death by the National Socialist state.

#### ---The alternative fails --- Ontological questioning causes paralysis in the face of oppression.

Levinas & Nemo 1985

Emmanuel, professor of philosophy, and Philippe, professor of new philosophy, Ethics and Infinity, pg. 6-7

Are we not in need of still more precautions? Must we not step back from this question to raise another, to recognize the obvious circularity of ask­ing what isthe “What is . .?“ question? It seems to beg the question. Is our new suspicion, then, that Heidegger begs the question of metaphysics when he asks “What is poetry?” or “What is thinking?”? Yet his thought is insistently anti-metaphysical. Why, then, does he retain the metaphysical question par excellence? Aware of just such an objection, he pro­poses, against the vicious circle of the *petitio principi,* an alternative, productive circularity: hermeneutic questioning. To ask “What is. . .?“ does not partake of onto-theo-logy if one acknowledges (1) that the answer can never be fixed absolutely, but calls essen­tially, endlessly, for additional “What is . . .?“ ques­tions. Dialectical refinement here replaces vicious circularity. Further, beyond the openmindedness called for by dialectical refinement, hermeneutic questioning (2) insists on avoiding subjective impositions, on avoid­ing reading into rather than harkening to things. One must harken to the things themselves, ultimately to being, in a careful attunement to what is. But do the refinement and care of the herme­neutic question — which succeed in avoiding onto­theo-logy succeed in avoiding all viciousness? Certainly they convert a simple fallacy into a produc­tive inquiry, they open a path for thought. But is it not the case that however much refinement and care one brings to bear, to ask what something is leads to asking what something else is, and so on and so forth, ad infinitum*?* What is disturbing in this is not so much the infinity of interpretive depth, which has the virtue of escaping onto-theo-logy and remaining true to the way things are, to the phenomena, the coming to be and passing away of being. Rather, the problem lies in the influence the endlessly open horizon of such thinking exerts on the way of such thought. That is, the problem lies in what seems to be the very virtue of hermeneutic thought, namely, the doggedness of the “What is . . .?“ question, in its inability to escape itself, to escape being and essence.

#### ---Prioritizing ontology is bad --- Human situatedness within Being means our relationships are always incomplete and the search for ‘Authenticity’ requires a false distancing which makes it indistinguishable from Nazism.

Zizek 1999

Slavoj, Distinguished Fashion Expert for Abercrombie and Fitch Quarterly, Senior Researcher in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and Codirector of the Center for Humanities at Birkbeck College, University of London, “The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology” pg. 14-15

One can see the ideological trap that caught Heidegger: when he criticizes Nazi racism on behalf of the true ‘inner greatness’ of the Nazi movement, he repeats the elementary ideological gesture of maintaining an inner distance towards the ideological text – of claiming that there is something more beneath it, a non-ideological kernel: ideology exerts its hold over us by means of this very insistence that the Cause we adhere to is not ‘merely’ ideological. So where is the trap? When the disappointed Heidegger turns away from active engagement in the Nazi movement, he does so because the Nazi movement did not maintain the level of its ‘inner greatness’, but legitimized itself with inadequate (racial) ideology. In other ords, hat he expected from it was that it should legitimize itself through direct awareness of its ‘inner greatness’. And the problem lies in this very expectation that a political movement that will directly refer to its historico-ontological foundaiton is possible. This expectation, however, is in itself profoundly metaphysical, in so far as it fails to recognize the gap separating the direct ideological legitimization of a movement from its ‘inner greatness’ (its historico-ontological essence) its constitutive, a positive condiiton of its ‘functioning’. To use the terms of the late Heidegger, ontological insight necessarily entails ontic blindness and error, and vice versa – that is to say, in order to be ‘effecitve’ at the ontic level, one must disregard the ontological horizon of one’s activity. (In this sense, Heidegger emphasizes that ‘science doesn’t think’ and that, far from being is limitation, this inability is the very motor of scientific progress.) In other words, what Heidegger seems unable to endorse is a concrete political engagement that would accept its necessary, constitutive blindness – as if the moment we acknowledge the gap separating the awareness of the ontological horizon from ontic engagement, any ontic engagement is depreciated, loses its authentic dignity.

#### ---The alternative’s rejection of human progress results in Nazi resurgence and human extinction.

Faye 2009

Emmanuel, Associate Professor at the University Paris Ouest–Nanterre La Défense, translated into English by Michael B. Smith, Professor Emeritus of French and Philosophy at Berry College and translator of numerous philosophical works into English, *Heidegger, the introduction of Nazism into philosophy in light of the unpublished seminars of 1933-1935*, pg. 322

The völkisch and fundamentally racist principles Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe transmits strive toward the goal of the eradication of all the intellectual and human progress to which philosophy has contributed. They are therefore as destructive and dangerous to current thought as the Nazi movement was to the physical existence of the exterminated peoples. Indeed, what can be the result of granting a future to a doctrine whose author desired to become the "spiritual Fuhrer" of Nazism, other than to pave the way to the same perdition? In that respect, we now know that Martin Heidegger, in his unpublished seminar on Hegel and the state, meant to make the Nazi domination last beyond the next hundred years. If his writings continue to proliferate without our being able to stop this intrusion of Nazism into human education, how can we not expect them to lead to yet another translation into facts and acts, from which this time humanity might not be able to recover? Today more than ever, it is philosophy's task to work to protect humanity and alert men's minds; failing this, Hitlerism and Nazism will continue to germinate through Heidegger's writings at the risk of spawning new attempts at the complete destruction of thought and the extermination of humankind.

#### You can’t affirm life and reject the way we celebrate it.

Porter 2000

James, “Nietzsche and the seduction of metaphysics,” <http://olincenter.uchicago.edu/pdf/porter.pdf>

Suppose that power resides solely in the feeling of power, that, as Nietzsche says, “It is not the works, it is the faith [or “belief”, der Glaube] that is decisive here, that determines the order of rank.” How in that case could the distinction between a rightful and a false claim to power be adjudicated, between “active” willing and “reactive” ressentiment? How could one tell (say) Zarathustra and Wagner apart if and insofar as both had the same feeling, the same pleasurable sensation of power (the same “Lust-Gefühl”)? Power is inseparable from the sensation one has of power, because power depends upon a pleasurable feeling, upon a sensation of difference, “a feeling of more power” (“ein Plus-Gefühl von Macht,”), or as he writes in Beyond Good and Evil, “the feeling of growth, the feeling of increased power.” This is the only criterion of power. How, then, can Nietzsche coherently deny to anyone who possesses the sensation a rightful claim to power? And how certifiable is the sensation? Does feeling certify power, or is it the other way around? Clearly, feeling certifies power and it is self-certifying as well. If so, then power may turn out to be no more than the codification of an error. Clearly, much hangs on the issue. The will to power, so viewed, is now vulnerable to Nietzsche’s critique of decadence and of ressentiment (a term whose root meaning, in the sentiment of sensation, brings us back again to the problem of power as the sensation of power). Perhaps worse, the very idea of “affirmation”, the unconditional, positive attitude towards life (viewed as will to power) is in danger of being disowned. For again, affirmation resides in the mere feeling of affirmation, in the feeling of power and of “sovereignty” one has: an irrefragable good and an essential and ineliminable property of life and of living subjects, affirmation ought to be something about which we can never, so to speak, go wrong whenever we feel it. And yet Nietzsche’s critique of ressentiment is an indictment of the affirmation of life that the reactive subject claims to have and feel. How consistent and effective is Nietzsche’s critique? How coherent is his view of power?

#### ---Policy planning is life affirming and imbedded within imminence --- Only the negative’s blanket rejection of change reduces the chaos of the world to a knowable ‘status quo’ that the plan deviates from.

Campbell 1993

David, Politics Without Principle, pg. 97-98

To be engaged with the world, whether as an individual or a state, is thus a matter of acting in a way that seeks to affirm life. The specific nature of the plans, policies, or proclamations that can work toward this end require debate and negotiation attuned to the context they seek to address; they cannot be specified in the abstract. One important point can be made, however. Because of the pervasive influence of instrumental rationality upon international political discourse, action tends to be endorsed and embarked upon only when it can be said to clearly lead toward a solution. To be sure, the nature of the action and its chances for success are obviously important considerations. In the first instance, however, it is the fact of action in response to the recognition of one’s engagement— though the action be no more than a strong declaration of one’s position— that is the most important step.

#### ---Life outweighs and preceeds value.

Kateb 1992

George, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “The Inner Ocean” pg. 141

But neither of these responses will do in the nuclear situation. To affirm existence as such is to go beyond good and evil; it is to will its perpetual prolongation for no particular reason. To affirm existence is not to praise it or love it or find it good. These responses are no more defensible than their contraries—no more defensible than calling exis­tence absurd, or meaningless, or worthless. All such responses are appro­priate only for particulars. Existence does not have systemic attributes amenable to univocal judgments. At least some of us cannot accept the validity of revelation, or play on ourselves the trick of regarding existence as if it were the designed work of a personal God, or presume to call it good, and bless it as if it were the existence we would have created if we had the power, and think that it therefore deserves to exist and is justifia­ble just as it is. No: these argumentative moves are bad moves; they are hopeless stratagems. The hope is to go beyond the need for reasons, to go beyond the need for justifying existence, and in doing so to strengthen, not weaken, one's attachment. Earthly existence must be preserved whatever we are able or unable to say about it. There is no other human and natural existence. The alternative is earthly nothingness. Things are better than nothing; anything is better than nothing.

#### ---Value to life cannot be measures externally --- Saying you know the exact conditions that make someone elses life not worth living is impossible and dehumanizing.

Schwartz 2002

Lisa, Lecturer in Philosophy of Medicine at the Department of General Practice at the University of Glasgow, *Medical Ethic: A case-based approach*, Chapter 6: A Value to Life: Who Decides and How? http://asia.elsevierhealth.com/media/us/samplechapters/9780702025433/9780702025433.pdf

The second assertion made by supporters of the quality of life as a criterion for decisionmaking is closely related to the first, but with an added dimension. This assertion suggests that the determination of the value of the quality of a given life is a subjective determination to be made by the person experiencing that life. The important addition here is that the decision is a personal one that, ideally, ought not to be made externally by another person but internally by the individual involved. Katherine Lewis made this decision for herself based on a comparison between two stages of her life. So did James Brady. Without this element, decisions based on quality of life criteria lack salient information and the patients concerned cannot give informed consent. Patients must be given the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they think their lives are worth living or not. To ignore or overlook patients’ judgement in this matter is to violate their autonomy and their freedom to decide for themselves on the basis of relevant information about their future, and comparative consideration of their past. As the deontological position puts it so well, to do so is to violate the imperative that we must treat persons as rational and as ends in themselves.